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Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased
Transparency, Consistency, and Fairness
in Pretrial Bargaining Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
PeterReilly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart is one of the wealthiest and most powerful companies
in the world. And billionaire gambling magnate Sheldon Adelson is
one of the wealthiest and most powerful individuals in the world. So
what do these two have in common besides wealth and power? They
are both being investigated for possible violations of the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), a federal law prohibiting the
payment of bribes to foreign government officials to obtain (or
retain) business.' If either party is ultimately indicted, the case might
not be addressed through a traditional courtroom trial. Instead, the
matter could be resolved through an Alternative Dispute Resolution
vehicle currently being employed by the U.S. Department of Justice:
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") or the NonProsecution Agreement ("NPA").
The use of such agreements is not guaranteed; rather, they are
awarded to defendants through elaborate negotiations with the
Justice Department. Indeed, Forbes magazine describes parties who
are accused of wrongdoing, but who ultimately manage to secure an

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; Georgetown-Hewlett Fellow in Conflict
Resolution and Legal Problem-Solving, Georgetown University Law Center (2002-2005). 1 am
grateful for the comments and guidance I received throughout this project from Cynthia Alkon,
Mark Burge, Charles Craver, Michael Green, Jim Hambleton, Kondi Kleinman, Mike Koehler,
Jill Levickas, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Tim Mulvaney, Lisa Rich, Matthew Runkel, Neil Sobol,
and Jean Sternlight. I also wish to thank the librarians at Texas A&M School of Law for their
helpful assistance. Of course, all errors are my own.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78ff (2012).
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NPA or DPA, as parties that have been "inducted into Club Fed
Deferred." 2
According to the Department of Justice, DPAs and NPAs are
said to occupy an "important middle ground" between declining to
prosecute on the one hand, and obtaining a conviction on the other.3
Since 2000, the Department has dramatically increased its use of
DPAs and NPAs, entering into a total of 257 publicly disclosed
agreements during that time. 4 Monetary recoveries related to DPAs
and NPAs over that thirteen-year period total more than $37 billion.
And while they might seem similar to plea bargains, DPAs and NPAs
are substantively quite different. In a plea bargain, defendants
negotiate for a lesser charge, penalty, or sentence, but they ultimately
accept guilt6 and conviction.' With DPAs and NPAs, on the other
hand, there are no looming trials, no guilty pleas, and no convictions.
Instead, DPAs and NPAs represent the opportunity for the
ultimate negotiation: It's an opportunity for parties accused of FCPA
violations to agree to clean up their respective acts, usually by (1)
adopting or enhancing internal anticorruption programs; (2) carrying
out self-policing audits and investigations; and (3) voluntarily
disclosing compliance issues and information to federal authorities.8
In addition to agreeing to implement various rules, policies, and
procedures to prevent bribery from taking place, the accused parties
2. Janet Novack, Club Fed, Deferred, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.forbes.
com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-deferred-cz jn 0824beltway.html.
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2008), available at
See also
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of
CorporateDeferred ProsecutionAgreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1869 (2005) ("Deferred
prosecution offers prosecutors an intermediate option between declination and plea bargaining,
as deferrals exact sanctions while circumventing the collateral consequences of a conviction.")
(internal citation omitted).
4. See 2013 Mid-Year Update on CorporateDeferred ProsecutionAgreements (DPAs) and
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON DUNN (July 9, 2013), http://www.
gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2013-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-Deferred-ProsecutionAgreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx [hereinafter 2013 Mid-Year Update].
5. Id.
6. Of course, an Alford plea would involve a no-contest plea where the defendant does not
admit guilt but nonetheless accepts a conviction. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing
Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003).
7. See Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1869 ("A guilty plea (in a plea bargain) results in a
conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been
convicted in a trial.") (citations omitted).
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 75 (Dec. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf., at 57-67.
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oftentimes agree to pay hefty monetary fines.' In exchange, the
Justice Department agrees to hold off (perhaps forever) on
prosecution. Ultimately, if all aspects of the negotiated agreement
are successfully carried out, the party initially accused can move
forward without fear of further legal consequences on the matter.10
But here is the problem: This ultimate negotiation between
prosecutor and accused can sometimes be unfair to the point where
any "bargaining" taking place is merely illusory. This is because in
many instances, the government has too much power, too much
leverage, and too much discretion in presenting, negotiating, and
implementing DPAs and NPAs. There is not enough transparency or
consistency within these two negotiation processes. As Federal
Appeals Court Judge Harry T. Edwards warned nearly three decades
ago, settling matters through Alternative Dispute Resolution is not
always "fair and just."" Indeed, former DOJ prosecutor David
Pitofsky points to an "imbalance of negotiating power" that
prosecutors have in these processes, stating:
One of the problems with the process of negotiating a
deferred prosecution agreement is that it is not really a
negotiation. Any push back by the company on a
provision that the government requests is not only
going to be shot down, but the government may see it
as a reflection that the company's claimed contrition is
not genuine. So, you don't even want to make the
argument for fear that it will cause the government to
look at you differently and decide that a deferral isn't
appropriate.12
This article will explore the factors that contribute to less-thanoptimal transparency, consistency, and fairness in pretrial bargaining
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The article will conclude
with recommendations to strengthen the current system and make it
more fair.
The article is divided into four Parts: Part II will discuss the extent
of the bribery problem worldwide; the history of the FCPA; and the
reasons behind the recent dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement.
9. See id. at 68-73.
10. See id. at 74-75.
11. Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REv. 668, 679 (1986) (emphasis in original).
12. Interview with David Pitofsky, 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 46 (8) (Nov. 28, 2005) (emphasis
added).

350

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 10:2

Part III will discuss the elements that make up FCPA
"jurisprudence" given that so few cases are litigated in court; the
history of using DPAs and NPAs to address corporate wrongdoing;
and the development of the guidelines and principles underlying DOJ
prosecutors' charging decisions with respect to corporate law
enforcement.
Part IV will delve more deeply into the guidelines underlying
DOJ prosecutors' charging decisions, questioning if recent steps
taken by DOJ have mistakenly led to a decrease in procedural
protections offered by the Department to parties accused of
corporate wrongdoing, thereby resulting in increased negotiation
power imbalances. This Part will also consider whether a corporate
"compliance defense" similar to that enacted in the United Kingdom
would be an appropriate and effective way to counterbalance DOJ's
superior negotiation power in the FCPA context. Finally, this Part
will discuss potential consequences of increasing judicial review
within the DPA and NPA negotiation and implementation processes.
Part V will discuss possible solutions to the overall dilemma
posed by the article, namely, how to increase transparency,
consistency, and fairness in pretrial negotiations between DOJ and
parties accused of FCPA violations.
II. HISTORY AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
A.

EXTENT OF THE BRIBERY PROBLEM

Given that bribe givers and bribe takers generally do not discuss
their activities, it is difficult to know the true extent of the bribery
problem worldwide. In 2012, according to Ernst & Young's 12th
Global Fraud Survey, thirty-nine percent of seventeen hundred
corporations across forty-three countries reported that bribery or
The
corrupt practices occur frequently in their countries."
percentage is far higher in rapid-growth markets-like in Brazil,
where eighty-four percent responded that corruption was
In 2010, approximately twenty-three of the
widespread.14
corporations surveyed worldwide by Ernst & Young admitted their
organizations had been approached to pay a bribe to retain or obtain
13. 12th Global Fraud Survey, ERNST & YOUNG (2012), available at http://www.ey.
com/GL/cn/Services/Assurance/Fraud-Investigation---Dispute-Services/Global-Fraud-Survey--a-place-for-integrity.
14. Id.
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business during the prior two years.15
The World Bank Institute estimates that the total amount of
bribes paid per year, worldwide, is approximately $1 trillion.16 This
figure is obtained from worldwide surveys of a wide range of
corporations and enterprises. The surveys ask questions about bribes
paid for day-to-day operation of the firm (e.g., acquiring necessary
licenses, meeting code and regulation standards, etc.), as well as
bribes paid to get favorable decisions on public procurement."
Note that the $1 trillion dollar figure is for bribery alone and not
for corruption more generally, i.e., the figure does not include
activities such as embezzlement, financial fraud, and self-dealing."
Also, there is no attempt to include the extent of bribery that is taking
place within the private sector itself, but only bribery transactions
that take place between the private sector and the public sector.
Finally, the $1 trillion figure includes bribery that is taking place
worldwide, (meaning within industrialized economies, within
emerging economies, and between industrialized and emerging
economies).1 9
B.

HISTORY OF THE FCPA

The World Bank identifies corruption as "the single greatest
obstacle to economic and social development."2 0 Specifically, the
Bank states that "[t]hrough bribery, fraud, and the misappropriation
of economic privileges, corruption taxes poor people by diverting
resources from those who need them most." 21
By no means has the United States been immune from the
ravages of corruption. Indeed, the U.S. Congress passed the FCPA in
1977 following a series of corruption scandals surrounding the
Watergate break-in and the resulting resignation of President Richard
15. Id.
16. Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance
Director Daniel Kaufmann, WORLD BANK NEWS & BROADCAST (last visited Mar. 31, 2014),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/O,,contentMDK:20190295-menuPK:3
4457-pagePK:34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
17. Id.
18. See generally Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global
Governance DirectorDaniel Kaufmann, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. WORLD BANK, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK 112 (2003), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/04/25/000090341-2006
0425085823/Rendered/PDF/27145OREVISED010WBORevised01 PUBLIC1.pdf.
21. Id.
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Specifically, while investigating contributions to the
Nixon.
President's reelection campaign, the U.S. Congress discovered that
over four hundred U.S. companies had paid bribes in excess of $300
million in order to win contracts overseas.2 2 Congress responded by
passing the FCPA, which would make it unlawful to pay bribes to
foreign government officials to obtain (or retain) business and
thereby "restore public confidence in the integrity of the American
business system."2 The Act consists of two sets of provisions: the
anti-bribery provisions24 and the books and records and internal
control provisions.25
The anti-bribery provisions of the Act criminalize the act of
making an
offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money" to "any foreign official for
purposes of ... influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity . . . or . . .

inducing such foreign official to use his influence with
a foreign government . . . in order to assist . . . in

obtaining or retaining business. 26
Both the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") are responsible for enforcing the
anti-bribery provisions of the Act.27
The books and records and internal control provisions of the Act,

both of which are enforced by the SEC, mandate that U.S. issuers2
"make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer. "29 Issuers must also devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that:
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization;
22. Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 35 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE TO THE FCPA (2011), available at
http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/lay-persons-guide.pdf.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1).
27. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 33
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83,89 (2007).
28. This category includes "any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to §
781 . .. or which is required to file reports under § 78o(d)." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
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(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to
permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for
assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect
to any differences ... .0
C.

INCREASED

FCPA ENFORCEMENT

During the first two decades after its passage, enforcement of the
FCPA was somewhat limited.31 Indeed, as of 1997, only seventeen
companies and thirty-three individuals had been charged under the
Act and "numerous commentators were bemoaning the paucity of
prosecutions."32 A decade later, however, enforcement of the FCPA
began to surge. The total number of cases brought by the DOJ and
SEC from 2007 to 2009 more than doubled the total of all such cases
brought in the statute's first thirty years. 3
Since the record-holding $800 million penalty for Siemens in
2008, each subsequent year has seen at least one corporate FCPA
case with a penalty of several hundred million dollars.3 4 In January
2009, the DOJ announced that "enforcement of the FCPA was [its]
top priority, second only to fighting terrorism."
In 2010, the SEC
and DOJ collectively charged forty-seven companies with FCPA
violations, leading to over $1 billion in fines, penalties, and
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
31. Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 495 (2011).
32. Krever, supra note 27, at 93-94.
33. Westbrook, supra note 31, at 495-96, 540.
34. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEw RELEASES
RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT OF 1977 viii (2012), available at http://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Newslnsights/

Publications/2012/01 /Shearman202OSterlings2ORecent2OTrends2and2Patterns2i-/Files/Vic
w20fuIl20January20201220iFCPA20Digesti/FileAttachment/FCPADigestJan2(12.pd f.
35. Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign CorruptPracticesAct and the Elusive Question of Intent, 47
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1465 (2010).
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disgorgement.3 6 By 2012, the average penalty for a transgressing
company amounted to $17.7 million.37 The pace and strength of
enforcement actions taken in the last several years appears to confirm
a leading Justice Department official's comment that: "FCPA
enforcement activity is stronger than it's ever been-and getting
stronger. "38
But why did FCPA enforcement rise so suddenly and
dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century? Clearly, one reason
was simply increases in international trade and investment.39
Concerns of bribery around the globe were addressed by the 1997
establishment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") Convention on Comating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.40 One
commentator notes an "explosion" in transnational bribery arising
partly from "the offer of bribes and export of corruption by investors
from Western countries." 4 1 Other commentators have argued that
responses to U.S. domestic terrorism and domestic corporate scandals
also played a role: First, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and second, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.
1.

TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001

The horrific events surrounding the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 ("9/11") led to high levels of cooperation among
governments throughout the world. To prevent similar attacks of
terrorism, it would be useful to implement coordinated, multinational
investigations-especially in the area of finance, as access to money
can oftentimes be the lifeblood of terrorist organizations. Prior to
9/11, only four countries had ratified the International Treaty on the
Suppression of Terrorism Financing. 42 By 2012, 174 nation-states
36. SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note 34, at ii.

37. Id. at iv.
38. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech at the 24th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-spcech-1 01 116.html.
39. See generally, Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct
-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 120 (2010).
40. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999), available at http://
www.oecd.org/daflanti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery ENG.pdf.
41. Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and
Fragmentation,24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 274 (1999).
42. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A.
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were signatories of the Treaty.4 3
Moreover, experts have long suggested that the financing of
terrorism can be linked to (and sometimes facilitated by) the corruption
of foreign officials." This led, in 2003, to the United States becoming an
initial signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.45
Ninety-six other countries signed the treaty in that same year, leading to
increased cooperation and collaboration in multinational efforts to root
out and combat both corruption and terrorism worldwide.46 At the
signing ceremony, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the treaty
was a "permanent enshrinement of the new global attitude toward
corruption" and that "[c]orruption is now unacceptable in any form, and
international cooperation is considered a key element of our respective
efforts to combat this scourge." 47
This cooperation and collaboration among various national
authorities helped pave the way for intergovernmental and
transnational regulatory networks 48 that are a necessary precursor to
effective worldwide FCPA enforcement. 49 Today, the U.S. Department of Justice has Resident Legal Advisors ("RLAs") in thirtyseven countries (including, among others, Iraq in the Middle East;
Liberia and Zambia in Africa; Afghanistan and Indonesia in Asia;
Bosnia and Serbia in Eastern Europe; and Mexico and Colombia in
South America) 0 who are supported by FBI agents in seventy-five
foreign cities."1 The DOJ can request evidence or other assistance
under a mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT"), a type of bilateral
Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999).
43. Id.
44. Louise I. Shelley & John T. Picarcll, Methods Not Motives: Implications of the
Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism, 3 POLICE PRACTICE &
RESEARCH 305, 305-06 (2002).
45. Press Release, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Dec. 10, 2003),
availableat http://www.un.org/webcast/merida/statements/pressrelease2-eng.htm.
46. Id.
47. Press Release, Signing of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Dec. 10, 2003).
48. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2009).
49. FCPA investigations raise a number of issues that can only be addressed when there is
international cooperation and coordination between and among enforcement agencies. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-47.110 (2008), availableat http://
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading-room/usam/title9/title9.htm.
50. Lanny A. Breuer, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at Columbia Law
School: The Global Case for Justice: Protecting Human Rights and Promoting the Rule of Law
(Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/pr/speeches/2009/10-0709breuer-speech.pdf.
51. See Legal Attach6 Offices, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fbi.gov/
contact-us/legat/legal-offices (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
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intergovernmental agreement that obligates foreign jurisdictions to
provide assistance.5 2 Such agreements have played a key role in the
FCPA enforcement context; senior DOJ officials note that in 2009, at
least twenty-five cooperation requests to foreign governments were
made pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties." Regarding the
outcomes of requests for cooperation, the DOJ reports it has
experienced "the gamut of cooperation -from full-scale sharing of
domestic investigative files on short notice to outright noncompliance."14
Nevertheless, the "vast majority" of requests have been granted."
In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has
entered into a network of memoranda of understanding ("MOUs")
with securities regulators in twenty foreign countries.5 6 These
agreements, according to the SEC, "delineate the terms of
information-sharing between and among MOU signatories and create
a framework for regular and predictable cooperation in securities law
enforcement."" While both MLATs and MOUs have been helpful in
bringing about trans-governmental cooperation, there is a difference
between the two, with one commentator contrasting the hard and
legally binding nature of MLATs with the soft, more flexible, and
legally nonbinding nature of MOUs:
Non-legally binding [MOUs] structure much of
transgovernmental cooperation.
While regulators
occasionally employ [MLATs], binding treaties that
may address a wide array of legal issues, MOUs are
frequently used to create a loose and adaptable
framework in which to share information, ideas, and
resources. MOUs are soft law agreements: non-binding
as a legal matter, but, at least in the view of many
regulators, highly effective and far more flexible. 8
52. See generally Michael D. Mann, Joseph G. Mari & George Lavdas, International
Agreements and Understandingsfor the Productionof Information and Other Mutual Assistance,
29 INT'L LAW J. 780 (1995).

53. F. Joseph Warin, John W. F. Chesley & Patrick F. Speice, Jr., Nine Lessons of 2009: The
Year-in-Review of Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19,45 (2010).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING
PHASE 3 OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY § 10.2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Cooperative Agreements with Foreign Regulators, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiacooparrangements.shtml (last visited July 19, 2013).
57. International Enforcement Assistance, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oialoiacrossborder.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
58. Kai Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2002).
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Together, these developments have led to increased cooperation
and collaboration among both U.S. and non-U.S. regulators in
international FCPA enforcement. The prosecutions of Siemens AG,
BAE Systems PLC, Alcatel-Lucent, Innospec, and others are
testament to the dramatic impact that the 9/11 tragedy has had in
spurring international treaties and cooperation necessary for more
efficient and effective FCPA enforcement.
2.

Sarbanes-Oxley

A second reason for the sudden and dramatic rise is FCPA
prosecutions is the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("Sarbanes-Oxley"), 9 which was enacted by Congress in response to
the scandalous ethics lapses and financial collapses surrounding firms
such as Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia. Commenting on the
economic reform laws passed by Congress, starting with SarbanesOxley, one commentator puts it thusly: "[I]n response to the
corporate and accounting scandals that began with Enron, but appear
to have no end in sight, the legislature attempted to restore faith in
America's financial markets by enacting new criminal statutes and
mandating stiffer penalties for economic crimes."60
Sarbanes-Oxley attempted to remedy and prevent corporate
misbehavior by, among other things, requiring that (1) companies
maintain internal controls for financial reporting and (2) that
corporate executives certify the accuracy of such reporting. The law
impacted numerous areas of corporate governance, especially
regarding voluntary disclosures of FCPA violations. 61 Specifically,
because Sarbanes-Oxley requires officers to disclose to the board of
directors "any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
issuer's internal controls," 62 voluntary disclosure of FCPA violations
(such as improper payments to foreign officials) increased.63

59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at U.S.C. §§
11, 15, 18,28, and 29).
60. Mary Krciner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 361 (2003).
61. See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 706 (2007).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (a)(5)(B) (2006).
63. See Laura E. Kress, How the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has Knocked the "SOX" Off the DOJ
and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2, 3-5 (2009).
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1II. ALPHABET SOUP: FCPA, NPAS, DPAS, AND DOJ
A.

FCPA "JURISPRUDENCE"

The primary way jurisprudence (meaning precedents, legal
opinions, and foundational principles and theories pursuant to a
particular statute or area of the law) is developed is through litigation
trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions. That is not happening
with the FCPA because cases are generally not going to trial but are
instead being resolved mostly through DPAs and NPAs. According to
one commentator, legal precedent is very important because of "its
continuous development through case law as courts clarify the
boundaries of permissible legal conduct by resolving questions of
ambiguity and vagueness; striking down overreaching laws as
unconstitutional; and signaling to legislators where legal gaps exist.""
According to Judge Richard Posner, it is the development of
precedent that ultimately defines the boundaries of permissible legal
behavior. 65 Moreover, says Judge Posner, legal precedent is the
important byproduct of the process of litigation, wherein attorneys
battle through argument and advocacy, and judges render legal
decisions and opinions. 66 It seems, then, American firms operating
abroad are having difficulty gauging the boundaries of the FCPA
because the continued use of DPAs and NPAs means decreased
litigation, thereby limiting the development of precedent that would
otherwise define these boundaries.67 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow
64. Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A CorporateCatch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 7 J.L. ECON. &
POL'Y 137, 155 (2010).
65. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 583 (Aspen, 6th ed. 2003).
66. Id. at 584.
67. See Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 2011 (statement of Rep.
Frank James Sensenbrenner, member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting "the absence of
case law interpreting the breadth and scope of the FCPA" and suggesting that such an absence
can play a role in increased prosecutorial discretion in FCPA cases; also noting that "companies
lack guidance" in how to conform to the FCPA). Although FCPA allegations very rarely go to
trial, some that have been tried in recent years have resulted in courts rejecting the somewhat
expansive theories put forward by the government. For example, in what are sometimes called
the "SHOT Show" cases, the DOJ charged twenty-two defendants with FCPA violations. The
charges arose from evidence that included hundreds of audio and video recordings, but after
three defendants pled guilty, two trials resulted in two acquittals and the dismissal of the
indictments against the remaining defendants. See Del Quentin Wilber, Charges Dismissed
Against 16 Accused of Bribing Foreign Official in Sting, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/charges-dismissed-against-16-accused-of-bribing-foreign-officia
1-in-sting/2012/02/21/gIOAOhU5RR story.html.
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sums up the point succinctly: "When an authoritative rule is necessary,
... the courts must adjudicate and provide clear guidance for all .... " 6 8
Instead, the jurisprudence or "law" of the FCPA is developing
primarily through (1) the terms and conditions set forth in NPAs and
DPAs currently used to resolve FCPA matters;69 (2) the reasons and
justifications for issuing "declination decisions," or decisions where DOJ
decides to drop the matter altogether rather than address it through a
diversion agreement or prosecution;"' and (3) the opinions and reasoning
being set forth by the DOJ through "Opinion Procedure Releases.""1
More detailed information regarding each of these follows.
1.

Non-ProsecutionAgreements

Under a Non-Prosecution Agreement, or NPA, the DOJ
"maintains the right to file charges but refrains from doing so to allow
the company to demonstrate its good conduct during the term of the
NPA." 2 Unlike a DPA, an NPA is not filed with a court of law.73 For
FCPA-related offenses, DOJ places on its official website any and all
NPAs negotiated with companies.7 4
The requirements of an NPA are similar to those of a DPA and
generally require (1) a waiver of the statute of limitations; (2) ongoing
cooperation; (3) admission of the material facts; (4) compliance and
remediation commitments; and (5) payment of a monetary penalty.75
If the company fully complies with the agreement, then DOJ will not
pursue criminal charges.76
2.

Deferred ProsecutionAgreement

Under a Deferred Prosecution Agreement, or DPA, the DOJ
files a charging document with the court77 and simultaneously
68. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay: For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985).
69. See Mike Kochler, The FaCade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 998
(2010) (arguing that privately negotiated settlements serve as de facto case law even though
they are subject to little or no judicial scrutiny).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 8, at 75.
71. Id. at 86-87.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 75.
74. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, www.justice.gov (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
75. Id. at 75.
76. Id.
77. But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,supra note 8, at 107 n.379
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requests that the prosecution be deferred, meaning "postponed for
the purpose of allowing the company to demonstrate its good
conduct."" DPAs typically require a defendant to (1) agree to pay a
monetary penalty; (2) cooperate with the government; (3) waive the
statute of limitations; (4) admit the relevant facts; and (5) "enter into
certain compliance and remediation commitments, potentially
including a corporate compliance monitor."79
DPAs describe the company's conduct, cooperation, remediation
(if any), and provide a calculation of the penalty under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. All DPAs are publicly filed, and DOJ places
them on its official website.80 If the company successfully completes
the term of the agreement (typically two to three years in length),
DOJ will then act to have the filed charges dismissed."'
3.

Declination Decisions

In connection with a June, 2011, U.S. House of Representatives
hearing on the FCPA, Congresswoman Sandy Adams and
Congressman James Sensenbrenner requested the DOJ to provide
information on cases that had been "brought to the attention of DOJ,
but [the DOJ] decided, for one reason or another, not to investigate
or pursue prosecution within the last year along with the rationale for
those decisions."8 2 The Members of Congress were referring to
"declination decisions," or decisions to decline to pursue action in a
given matter. Learning why the DOJ feels justified in declining to
prosecute a particular matter would be quite instructive for the
individuals and corporations attempting to draw up and implement
policies, rules, and regulations enabling them to steer clear of possible
violations (and prosecutions) themselves.
Assistant Attorney General Ronald Welch responded to
Representatives Adams and Sensenbrenner by generally referring to

(noting that, while it is no longer DOJ's practice, historically the Department had, on occasion,
agreed to DPAs with companies that were not filed with the court).
78. Id. at 74.
79. Id.
80. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, www.justice.gov (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
81. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 8, at 74 ("A
company's successful completion of a DPA is not treated as a criminal conviction.").
82. Letter from Frank James Sensenbrenner & Sandy Adams, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (June
22, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/68419036/DOJ-Declination-Responses-toCongress.
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the Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations," and by
pointing out that those principles require Federal prosecutors to
consider the following when determining whether or not to prosecute
a corporate entity for an alleged FCPA violation: (1) the nature and
seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of wrong doing
within the corporation; (3) the corporation's history of similar
conduct; (4) the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's
preexisting compliance program; and (5) the adequacy of remedies,
such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.8 Mr. Welch added
that during the two years prior to the June 2011 Congressional
Hearing, the DOJ declined matters in which "some or all of the
following circumstances existed:""
A corporation voluntarily and fully self-disclosed
potential misconduct Corporate principals voluntarily
engaged in interviews with the Department and
provided truthful and complete information about
their conduct
A parent corporation voluntarily and fully selfdisclosed information to the Department regarding
alleged conduct by subsidiaries
A parent company conducted extensive preacquisition due diligence of potentially liable
subsidiaries, and engaged in significant remediation
efforts after acquiring the relevant subsidiaries
A company provided information to the
Department about the parent's extensive compliance
policies, procedures, and internal controls, which the
parent had implemented at the relevant subsidiaries
A company agreed to a civil resolution with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, while also
demonstrating that a declination was appropriate for
additional reasons
A single employee, and no other employee, was
involved in the provision of improper payments;
moreover, the improper payments involved minimal
83. The Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations are available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
84. Letter from Ronald Welch, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, to
Sandy Adams, U.S. House of Representatives, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/68419036/
DOJ-Declination-Rcsponses-to-Congress.
85. Id.
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funds compared to the overall business revenues. 86
At the end of the letter, Mr. Welch points out that the DOJ has a
"long-standing policy" of not providing nonpublic information on
matters it has declined to prosecute, and, consequently, the
Department "cannot comment more specifically about FCPA matters
where prosecution was declined."87 This is unfortunate. The more
specific and detailed DOJ can be in offering reasons why it declines to
prosecute a given case, the more helpful it is in giving guidance to
other individuals and corporate entities trying to stay within legal
bounds vis-i-vis the FCPA.
Interestingly, it appears the DOJ might be opening up more
regarding matters it has declined to prosecute. In April 2012, the
Department offered its first-ever publicly stated declination. In the
context of an individual enforcement action against Garth Peterson,
the Department publicly stated it declined to prosecute Peterson's
employer, Morgan Stanley. The DOJ stated the following regarding
the declination:
After considering all the available facts and
circumstances, including that Morgan Stanley
constructed and maintained a system of internal
controls, which provided reasonable assurances that its
employees were not bribing government officials, the
Department of Justice declined to bring any
enforcement action against Morgan Stanley related to
Peterson's conduct.
The company voluntarily
disclosed this matter and has cooperated throughout
the department's investigation."
Indeed, the Department goes into a fair bit of detail on the
various internal controls and training programs put into place by
Morgan Stanly in order to prevent employees from bribing:
According to court documents, Morgan Stanley
maintained a system of internal controls meant to
ensure accountability for its assets and to prevent
employees from offering, promising or paying
anything of value to foreign government officials.
Morgan Stanley's internal policies, which were
86. Letter from Ronald Welch, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads
Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html.
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updated regularly to reflect regulatory developments
and specific risks, prohibited bribery and addressed
corruption risks associated with the giving of gifts,
business entertainment, travel, lodging, meals,
charitable contributions and employment. Morgan
Stanley frequently trained its employees on its internal
policies, the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.
Between 2002 and 2008, Morgan Stanley trained
various groups of Asia-based personnel on anticorruption policies fifty-four times. During the same
period, Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on the FCPA
seven times and reminded him to comply with the
FCPA at least thirty-five times. Morgan Stanley's
compliance
personnel
regularly
monitored
transactions, randomly audited particular employees,
transactions and business units, and tested to identify
illicit payments.
Moreover, Morgan Stanley
conducted extensive due diligence on all new business
partners and imposed stringent controls on payments
made to business partners.89
It is unclear why the DOJ was willing to make public its reasons
for declining to prosecute Morgan Stanley, the employer of Garth
Peterson. At least one practitioner suggests that the DOJ might have
been more transparent than usual because it felt pressure from
ongoing campaigns to convince the U.S. Congress to amend the
FCPA. Specifically, Larry Boyd, Executive Vice President, Secretary
& General Counsel of Ingram Micro, Inc., stated in a 2012 Chief
Legal Officer Leadership Forum:
I suspect that this announcement by the Justice
Department had as much to do with the effort that the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been mounting over
the last 18 months to try to get Congress to amend the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as it does with Morgan
Stanley's good conduct. 0
Whatever the motivation might be, it seems clear that the more
specific and detailed the DOJ can be in offering reasons why it
declines to prosecute a given case, the more helpful it is in giving
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 88.
90. See Larry Boyd, EVP, Sec'y & Gen. Counsel, 2012 Chief Legal Officer Leadership
Forum (May 3, 2012), available at http://www.argylejournal.com/articles/session-transcript-larryboyd-evp-secretary-general-counsel-ingram-micro-inc/.
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guidance to other individuals and corporate entities trying to adhere
to the FCPA.
4.

Opinion ProcedureReleases

When the FCPA was enacted, the law directed the U.S. Attorney
General to establish a procedure to provide responses to inquiries by
those subject to the law regarding how a particular behavior or plan
of action might (or might not) conform with the DOJ's "present
enforcement policy."91 In other words, a process needed to be put
into place whereby subjects of the law could write in and get a sense,
in the form of a DOJ Opinion Procedure Release, of whether or not
"specified, prospective-not hypothetical-conduct" would run afoul
of the FCPA law.92
The DOJ has published Opinion Procedure Releases on a
number of FCPA issues and in nearly all of them, the DOJ states it
will not bring enforcement action with respect to the proposed
conduct, usually based on the proactive compliance measures set
forth by the company or individual seeking the opinion. 3 Moreover,
if the opinion states that the contemplated conduct conforms with the
FCPA, that opinion is then entitled to a rebuttable presumption
should an enforcement action later be brought as a result of the
contemplated conduct. 94
There is, however, a crucial caveat: Opinion Procedure Releases
do not have precedential value. Therefore, while the DOJ makes the

opinions available to the general public through its web site,95 neither

91. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2011).
92. Id.
93. In one example, the Requestor proposed "to pay certain expenses for a trip to the
United States by one official from each of two foreign government agencies to learn more about
the services provided by the Requestor. The two officials will be selected by their agencies,
without the involvement of the Requestor . . . . The Requestor has no non-routine business
pending before the foreign government agencies that employ these officials. The sponsored
program will last for approximately two days (not including travel time). The Requestor
intends to pay for economy class air fare, domestic lodging, local transport, and meals." In
response, the DOJ stated that the expenses contemplated were reasonable and, citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-2(c)(2)(A), in conformance with the FCPA provisions relating to "the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services." Therefore, the DOJ stated that it "does
not presently intend to take any enforcement action with respect to the planned program and
proposed payments described in this request." The opinion is available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/.
94. 28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (2011).
95. The Opinion Procedure Releases are available through the U.S. Department of Justice
website at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpalopinion/.
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individuals nor corporate entities can rely upon those opinions, as a
matter of law, to protect themselves from federal prosecution for
engaging in similar conduct. Indeed, every opinion specifically states
that it "has no binding application to any party which did not join in
the request [of the opinion]. . . ."96 Again, this is unfortunate because
if these opinions had precedential value, they would be more helpful
in giving guidance to other individuals and corporate entities trying to
follow the law under the FCPA.
The difficulty with FCPA "jurisprudence" being created mostly
through NPAs, DPAs, declination decisions, and Opinion Procedure
Releases is that these various vehicles do not provide enough
guidance to the general public. Although the DOJ and the SEC
published a much-anticipated "guidance" 97 to the FCPA in November
2012, that, too, "breaks little new ground" in terms of shedding light
on what can sometimes be a subtle and complicated area of the law.98
Indeed, Steven Tyrrell, former Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section,
called the guidance "more of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC
successes than a guide book for companies who care about playing by
the rules." 99
B.

HISTORY OF USING DPAS AND NPAs

In the early twentieth century, DPAs and NPAs emerged as
courts sought alternatives to prosecution for juvenile defendants and
first-time offenders.'0 These alternative processes helped to manage
busy court dockets, and they allowed juveniles to avoid the stigma of
criminal conviction.1 01 During the last half century, DPAs became an
increasingly popular way for prosecutors to deal with a growing
number of drug offenders. 102
DPAs were initially used for individuals. In the Speedy Trial Act
of 1974, Congress officially recognized the practice of deferral by
96. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 11-01, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2011/11-01.pdf.
97. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 8.
98. Kevin J. Harnisch et al., The DisappearingException for FacilitatingPayments, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 11, 2013, available at http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ20-20Har
nisch-Witzel-Roth20Feb2O2Ol3.pdf.
99. Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732473510457811885(181434228.html.
100. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163 (2008).
101. Brandon L. Garrett, StructuralReform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 905-06 (2007).
102. Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1866.
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including assessment of deferrals among the tasks of pretrial service
agencies.10 3 These agencies evaluated individual defendants and
helped determine the progress being made (including the extent to
which agreement terms were being followed) by individuals whose
prosecutions had been deferred.m
In 1977, the DOJ promulgated standards for deferral of
prosecution, citing three principal objectives-and using language
clearly suggesting that diversion agreements were designed to
monitor individuals rather than corporations or business entities. The
objectives include:
[1] to prevent future criminal activity among
certain offenders by diverting them from traditional
processing into community supervision and services;
(2) to save prosecutive and judicial resources for
concentration on major cases; and
(3) to provide, where appropriate, a vehicle for
restitution to communities and victims of crime.10
One could hardly imagine that the phrase "diverting them from
traditional processing into community supervision and services" was
written in reference to corporations. And yet, over time, the
government clearly extended the scope of these agreements so they
could be applied to corporate and other business entities. One of the
earliest uses of DPAs in the corporate context was in 1994 when Mary
Jo White, then the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, entered into a DPA with Prudential Securities, Inc.10
While that agreement helped blaze a trail for other prosecutors
to negotiate pretrial diversion agreements, the DOJ initially used the
agreements quite sparingly. Indeed, between 1994 and 1996, the DOJ
entered into only ten corporate DPAs and NPAs all together."0
Between 1996 and 2002, the DOJ filed only six more.'0 However,
starting in 2002, DOJ's use of corporate DPAs and NPAs increased
dramatically, peaking in years 2007 (with thirty-nine filings), 2010
(with thirty-nine filings) and 2012 (with thirty-seven filings). 109 With
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-22.010 (2008), available at
www.justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia-readingroom/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm.
106. Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1872 (2005).
107. Spivack & Raman, supra note 100, at 164.
108. Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on ProsecutorialDiscretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1444 (2007).
109. 2013 Mid-Year Update, supra note 4.
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respect to the FCPA alone, since 2004, DPA and NPA agreements
have been used to resolve a vast majority (seventy-seven percent) of
enforcement actions involving corporate defendants.110
C.

DOJ Guidelines Concerning Corporate Prosecution

Since beginning in 1999, the DOJ has issued four key
memoranda setting forth prosecution guidelines or principles
underlying prosecutors' charging decisions with respect to corporate
enforcement."' The frameworks of the memos could be applied to all
areas of corporate criminal conduct, including securities fraud, health
care fraud, environmental crimes, antitrust and FCPA violations, and
These four memos-each refining the arguments and
more.
reasoning of its respective predecessor-have, as a group, served to
clear a path for increasing DOJ's use of DPAs and NPAs, especially
in the context of FCPA cases. The memos give prosecutors great
leeway in whom to charge, what to charge, and what terms to set forth
within DPAs or NPAs if such agreements are ultimately negotiated.
Perhaps most importantly, the four memos have served as a
foundation for the DOJ to broadly interpret the FCPA with limited
judicial scrutiny or interference.112
1.

The Holder Memo

The first memo, entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations,"
was issued in 1999 by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder
(the "Holder Memo"). The memo aimed to provide "guidance as to
what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in making the
decision whether to charge a corporation in a particular case."" 3 The
memo set forth the following eight factors for prosecutors to consider:
The nature and seriousness of the offense,
including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable
policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution
110. See Mike Koehler, DOJ Prosecutionof Individuals- Are Other Factorsat Play?, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-areother-factors-at-play.
111. Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1863.
112. Koehler, supra note 69, at 907 (2010) (arguing that FCPA violations are oftentimes
settled using diversion agreements that are not subject to judicial scrutiny).
113. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., on Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF.
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of corporations for particular categories of crime:
The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
corporation, including the complicity in, or
condonation (sic) of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management;
The corporation's history of similar conduct,
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it;
The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure
of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work
product protections;
The existence and adequacy of the corporation's
compliance program;
The corporation's remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the
relevant government agencies;
Collateral consequences, including disproportionate
harm to shareholders and employees not proven
personally culpable; and,
The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as
civil or regulatory enforcement actions. 114
Deputy Attorney General Holder acknowledged the eight
factors listed could change over time, and stated that "federal
prosecutors are not required to reference [the] factors in a particular
case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded
specific factors in reaching their decision.""

One of the more controversial aspects of the Holder Memo was
the somewhat vague definition of "willingness to cooperate"
discussed within the fourth of the eight factors.116 Specifically, it was
controversial that the DOJ's assessment of a company's willingness to
cooperate depended in part on (1) whether the company would be
willing to waive its work product and attorney-client protections; 117
114.
115.
116.
117.

Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 113, at § II(A).
Id. at Introduction.
Id. at § I(A)(4).
Id. at § VI(B).
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(2) whether the company "appeared to be protecting its culpable
employees and agents" by advancing their attorneys' fees, retaining
them without sanction, or providing them with information about the
government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement;"'
and (3) whether the company engaged in sufficient remedial actions
such as paying restitution, improving corporate compliance programs,
and disciplining or terminating wrongdoers within the company.119
It was problematic for some companies that, according to the
Holder Memo, "willingness to cooperate" was only one of eight
different factors considered in the DOJ's charging decision. That
meant that even if a company provided significant cooperation, the
government could nonetheless decide to charge based on any
combination (or weighting) of the remaining seven factors listed in
the memo. The Holder Memo, then, was heavily criticized for its lack
of detail and guidance regarding what would be considered
"authentic cooperation" in the eyes of the DOJ during a given
investigation.12 0

2. The Thompson Memo
The DOJ's second advisory memo, "Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations," was issued in 2003 by thenDeputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson ("Thompson Memo").
The main focus of the memorandum was "increased emphasis on and
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation." 2' To this
end, the Thompson Memo left intact the factors put forth in the
Holder Memo regarding assessing a company's willingness to
cooperate (discussed supra), and then added one more: Prosecutors
should consider whether the corporation engages in conduct "that
impedes the investigation (whether or not rising to the level of
criminal obstruction)."122
There was a good deal of criticism from academics, practicing
lawyers, and members of the U.S. Congress aimed at the Thompson
118. Id. at § VI(B).
119. Id.
120. Id. at Introduction.
121. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., on to Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.American
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/priviegewaiver/2003jan20 privwaiv-doj tho
mp.authcheckdam.pdf.
122. Id. at § VI(B).
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Memo for failing to provide guidance on when and how privilege
waiver would be required, and for failing to provide standards by
which a corporation could determine when an employee was culpable
enough to warrant withholding his or her legal fees stemming from a
DOJ investigation. 123 In response to the criticism, then-Acting
Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum issued a memorandum
in October 2005, entitled Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and
Work-Product Protection ("McCallum Memo"). 124
The McCallum Memo suggested that, in order to ensure federal
prosecutors exercise "appropriate prosecutorial discretion" under the
principles of the Thompson Memo, some United States Attorneys
have
established review processes for waiver requests that
require federal prosecutors to obtain approval from
the United States Attorney or other supervisor before
seeking a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection. Consistent with this best
practice, you are directed to establish a written waiver
review process for your district or component. 125
The Memo went on to state that the review processes
implemented may vary from district to district (or component to
component) so each United States Attorney or component head
"retains the prosecutorial discretion necessary, consistent with their
circumstances, to seek timely, complete, and accurate information
from business organizations."1 26
The Thompson Memo and the McCallum Memo combined to
form a DOJ policy that was still somewhat aggressive in seeking
123. See, e.g., Rebecca C.E. McFadyen, The Thompson Memo: Its Predecessors, Its
Successor,and Its Effect on CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,8 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 23, 29 (2007)
("The Thompson Memo recognized the impropriety of a waiver request for communications
regarding a corporation's ongoing defense in a criminal investigation, but the Memo's general
lack of guidance created a 'wide area in the middle where the practices of federal prosecutors
vary considerably."'); see also The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in
CorporateInvestigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary,109th Cong. 147 (2006)
(statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block) (arguing there was a lack of
uniform standards in the application of the Thompson Memo and, further, arguing for revisions
to the Memo "so that it no longer encourages an environment where employees risk losing their
jobs or legal defense").
124. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., on
Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/
Corp-Prosec/McCallum Memo 10 21_-05.pdf.
125. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., supra note 124.
126. Id.
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waivers of attorney-client and work product protections. This policy
came under dramatic scrutiny in the 2006 case of United States v.
Stein. In Stein, the DOJ indicted, among others, Jeffrey Stein, a
former partner of the accounting firm KPMG. 2 7 The corporate policy
of KPMG was to pay all of Mr. Stein's legal fees associated with the
case.128 In accordance with DOJ policy, the prosecutors in the case
(1) inquired as to KPMG's obligation to pay Stein's legal fees in
assessing the authenticity of KPMG's cooperation,129 and (2) insisted
that KPMG as well as its current and former employees waive their
attorney-client privilege.13 0 KPMG agreed to waive the privilege in
order to obtain a DPA, which the DOJ granted. 3 '
Judge Lewis Kaplan of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York sharply criticized the DOJ for
infringing upon KPMG employees' Sixth Amendment right of access
to counsel, and Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.13 2 Specifically,
Judge Kaplan found that the Thompson Memo interfered with
KPMG's policy of paying for employee access to legal counsel,
thereby undermining the adversarial process required for a fair
trial.133 Ultimately, the indictments against Mr. Stein and the other
KPMG employees were dismissed, a decision that was upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.134
3.

The McNulty Memo

Immediately following the decision in Stein, then-Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty issued a memorandum on December
12, 2006, establishing a new procedure regarding waivers of the
doctrine. 5
attorney-client privilege and
the work-product
Thereafter, in order to demand that a company waive one or both
protections, federal prosecutors had to first get approval from the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the DOJ's Criminal Division

127. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 350.
131. Id. at 352-53.
132. Spivack & Raman, supra note 100, at 169.
133. Id. at 368-69.
134. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2008).
135. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Components
and U.S. Attorneys, (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/
menulty-memo.pdf.
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(and in limited cases from the Deputy Attorney General). 13 6 In
addition, the McNulty Memo made it clear that a company's payment
of legal fees for employees pursuant to a DOJ investigation may be
used in calculating the authenticity of that company's cooperation
only in extremely rare circumstances.13 7
4. The Filip Memo

The McNulty Memo lasted less than two years. Then-Deputy
Attorney General Mark R. Filip issued the most recent guidance,
which was codified in the United States Attorney's Manual on August
28, 2008 ("Filip Memo").'38
The Filip Memo instructs prosecutors to consider the following
factors when determining whether or not to charge a corporation or
business entity: (1) The corporation's "timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents"; and (2) The corporation's "remedial
actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate
compliance program (or to improve an existing one), to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to
pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government
agencies."l 39 In assessing cooperation, the Filip Memo goes on to
explain that prosecutors may consider "the corporation's willingness
to provide relevant information and evidence [as well as] identify
relevant actors within and outside the corporation."'o The Filip
Memo explains that cooperation is a "potential mitigating factor" but
the "failure to cooperate, in and of itself, does not support or require

filing of charges."l41

The new guidelines under the Filip Memo changed previous
policies in two important ways: First, in assessing a corporation's
willingness to cooperate, prosecutors were no longer permitted to
consider whether that corporation paid legal fees for employees, or
136. Robert J. Ridge & Mackenzie A. Baird, The Pendulum Swings Back: Revisiting
Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV.
187,193-94.
137. Spivack & Raman, supra note 100, at 170.
138. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-28.000 through 928.1300 (2008), availableat http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
139. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
140. Id. at § 9-28.700(A).
141. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 139, at § 928.700(A).
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whether it entered into a joint defense agreement with employees.142
Second, DOJ prosecutors were no longer permitted to ask a
corporation to disclose information protected under the workproduct doctrine and attorney-client privilege. Specifically, the Filip
Memo stated that while a corporation "remains free to convey nonfactual or 'core' attorney-client communications or work-product-if
and only if the corporation voluntarily chooses to do so-prosecutors
should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to do so."1 4 3 The
bottom line was this: Prosecutors were directed to evaluate a
company's willingness to cooperate based on whether a company
provided "relevant facts" rather than whether the company was
willing to waive various protections. 1"
IV. TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE POWER IMBALANCE
A.

PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS WEAKENED?

One of the goals of every successive memorandum issued by the
DOJ, discussed supra Part III, from the Holder Memo issued in 1999
to the Filip Memo issued in 2008, was to increase procedural
protections for corporate entities under investigation. However, it
could be argued that the last memorandum actually took a step
backward in terms of procedural protection. Indeed, two
commentators argue that the Filip Memo "may actually lessen the
procedural protections that the McNulty Memo offered . . . [because]

no approvals are required for a prosecutor to seek factual material
even where its provision may require a privilege waiver. "145
The core of the Filip Memo directed prosecutors to focus on
"relevant facts" of a given investigation. But what can or should a
company do if certain "relevant facts" make good candidates for
attorney-client privilege protection, or constitute central components
of attorney work-product? Indeed, several practicing attorneys have
argued that despite the directives within the Filip Memo, "it is likely
that prosecutors will continue to look favorably on waivers. Thus,
142. Id. at § 9-28.730.
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 139, at § 928.710.
144. Id. at § 9-28.720.
145. Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far Enough?,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.stblaw.com/google-file.cfm?TrackedFile=
4B46116003DFF48682B3&TrackcdFolder=585C1 D235281AED996AO7D5F9F9478AB5A90188
899 (emphasis added).
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waiving privileges is likely to remain one way to demonstrate

cooperation."146
Moreover, while the Filip Memo appears steadfast in its directive
that privilege waivers not be required during the DOJ's investigative
processes, the Filip Memo simultaneously (and perhaps
inconsistently?) states that "a corporation that does not disclose the
relevant facts about the alleged misconduct-for whatever reasontypically should not be entitled to receive credit for cooperation."1 47
The clear implication seems to be that, despite the issuance of
the Filip Memo, companies seeking credit for cooperation might
nonetheless be required (or at least feel pressured) to disclose
privileged information in those instances when DOJ believes the
information constitutes "relevant facts." In fact, former Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty argues that under the Filip Memo
guidelines, "there is still a pressure to waive attorney-client privilege
if you have 'relevant factual information' covered by attorney-client
privilege that the government wants to get." 4 8
Moreover, McNulty contends that "quite a bit" of "relevant
factual information" is subject to privilege claims: "Take notes from
witness interviews, sure, you can tell the government what the person
said, but the government is often interested in seeing the notes of the
interview and other material memoranda that would be subject to
privilege." 149 McNulty is suggesting that the Filip Memo failed in its
effort to blunt certain federal prosecutor powers during
investigations, because there can still be underlying pressure on
companies to waive attorney-client privilege in certain instances.s 0
In practice, then, it appears the Filip Memo may have failed in
achieving one of its primary goals: To rein in DOJ prosecutorial
power through increased procedural protections for corporations
under investigation. As one commentator soberly puts it: "[T]here is
a real possibility that the new guidelines may create an underground
system of waiver and coercion because these tactics have become so
146. See ANTHONY ALEXIS ET AL., REQUESTS TO WAIVE CORPORATE ATORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 6-7 (2009), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/
publications/article.asp?id=6384&nid=6.
147. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATFORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.720 (2008),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroomlusam/title9/28mcrm.htm
available at
(emphasis added).
148. Brian Baxter, With Thompson Trashed and McNulty Moot, Filip Memo's Time has
Come, AM. L. DAILY, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2008/08/ with-thompson-t.html.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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entrenched in white-collar practice."151
If that commentator is correct and an "underground system of
waiver and coercion" leads to commonplace infringements on
attorney-client or work product protections, that would be a dire state
of affairs indeed.
These privileges, with their ethical and
constitutional underpinnings, are extremely important. They help
bring about and protect "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice." 52
Not only does the Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that
attorneys have an ethical duty of loyalty- including a duty of
confidentiality-to their clients,'5 but some commentators go so far
as to suggest that confidentiality between attorney and client is
protected by the U.S. Constitution because the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel incorporates "meaningful" representation, which, it is
argued, cannot be assured without protected communication between
attorneys and their clients. 4
Moreover, it appears that while the DOJ has been placing more
restrictions on the ability of prosecutors to request waivers of
attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection, the
descriptions of cooperation contained in DPAs and NPAs have
become increasingly vague. For example, in the DOJ's 2013 NPA
with the Ralph Lauren Corporation, the Agreement's discussion of
cooperation includes the following:
the Company's extensive, thorough, and real-time
cooperation with the Department, including conducting
an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees
available for interviews, making voluntary document
disclosures, conducting a world-wide risk assessment,
and making multiple presentations to the Department
on the status and findings of the internal investigation
and the risk assessment ... .1
151. See Matt Senko, ProsecutorialOverreachingin Deferred ProsecutionAgreements, 19 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 168 (2009) (concluding that, even post-Filip, "the DOJ retains the
leverage it has always wielded to force one-sided terms upon corporate entities in DPAs").
152. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent ... .").
154. See Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client
Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145,
158 n.92 (2003) (listing cases where courts have found a violation of the Sixth Amendment when
there was a violation of the attorney-client privilege).
155. Letter from Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney, & Jeffrey H. Knox, Chief of the Fraud
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[Ralph Lauren Corporation must] truthfully and
completely disclose non-privileged information with
respect to the activities of the Company, its officers,
directors, employees, and others concerning all
matters about which the Department inquires of it,
which information can be used for any purpose, except
as otherwise limited in this Agreement .... 156
[Ralph Lauren Corporation must] provide the
Department, upon request, all non-privileged
information, documents, records, or other tangible
evidence regarding matters arising out of the conduct
covered by this Agreement about which the
Department or any designated law enforcement agency
inquires ... ."I

One commentator suggests that such vague language used by
DOJ in their DPAs and NPAs results in decreased guidance for other
corporations attempting to secure a favorable outcome through
pretrial negotiations with DOJ. Specifically, the commentator argues
that companies attempting to avoid indictment are left "in a
precarious situation as they will be forced to speculate as to what
conduct will be rewarded. As a result, companies likely will err on
the side of disclosure and coercion to ensure that prosecutors
perceive them as cooperative.""' Another commentator makes the
following, similar argument:
Prosecutors employ general terms that require
broad corporate obedience in any and all matters
related to the investigation. . . . These nonspecific

terms that call for comprehensive cooperation give
government investigators broad authority to compel
disclosure of information and force internal changes,
while leaving companies virtually defenseless . . . .
These terms clearly favor the prosecutor and are only
Section of the Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, on the Non-Prosecution of the Ralph
Lauren Corporation (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpal
cases/ralph-lauren/Ralph-Lauren.-NPA-Executed.pdf (emphasis added).
156. Letter from Loretta E. Lynch, supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. See Susan B. Heyman, Bottoms-Up: An Alternative Approach for Investigating
CorporateMalfeasance, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 163,179-80 (2010).
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accepted by entities because they have no ammunition
at the bargaining table.'
Moreover, this decrease in guidance (again, resulting from DOJ's
vague descriptions of cooperation contained in DPAs and NPAs)
could potentially make companies feel that it would be unwise to
deny any of the DOJ's overtures or requests made during pretrial
negotiations, regardless of how fair or unfair such requests might be.
Mary Jo White, former United States Attorney and current
Chairperson of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, once
hinted at the difficulty of saying "no" to federal prosecutors during
pre-trial negotiations in the corporate context:
To ensure that a company does not become that "rare" case
resulting in a corporate indictment with all of its attendant negative
consequences .

.

. a company must not poke the government in the

eye by declining any of its requests or suggestion of how a
cooperative, good corporate citizen is to behave in the government's
criminal investigation.
This template, in my view, can give
prosecutors too much power. 6"
U.S. District Court Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of
New York expresses a similar sentiment when he states in a recent
court opinion:
"In the deferred prosecution context, the
defendant is presented with the opportunity for diversion from the criminal proceeding altogether. For
obvious reasons, a defendant in these circumstances is
less likely to raise a purported impropriety with the
process, let alone seek the court's aid in redressing it,
given the risk of derailing the deferral of prosecution."1 61
B.

THE RESULT: NEGOTIATION POWER IMBALANCE

Commentators have suggested that the DOJ has more power
than corporations during the typical negotiation of a DPA or NPA;
indeed, one commentator suggests the process is similar to "the
confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered corporations recant
their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any
159. See Senko, supra note 151, at 177.
160. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperationand the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 327 (2007).
161. United States v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., et al., No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 11 (E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2013).
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underlying offense."11 2
Given its enormous leverage in the negotiation, the DOJ can
oftentimes negotiate quite favorable prosecution agreements, whose
terms can include large financial penalties, significant internal business
reforms, and cooperation in pursuing the company's individually
culpable directors, executives, managers, and/or employees. 163 This
cooperation can include the company admitting liability, identifying
wrongdoers within the organization, and sometimes even waiving
work-product protection and attorney-client privilege pursuant to
internal documents and internal investigations.6
Forbes magazine describes the group of corporations that have
been accused of wiongdoing but have had their prosecutions deferred
as those who have been "inducted into Club Fed Deferred."1 65 The
decision of whether or not a corporation will be invited to join this club
appears to be at the complete discretion of the DOJ-something that
amounts to a great deal of power during any negotiations with accused
corporations. Indeed, Andrew Weissmann, the former director of the
DOJ's Enron Task Force, testified before the United States Senate that
''aggressive or misinformed" prosecutors can potentially "exploit the
power imbalance inherent in the current FCPA statute" as they
conduct pre-trial negotiations with accused parties.6
While the DOJ has complete discretion on whether or not to
offer accused parties an NPA or a DPA, the consequences of not
being offered one or the other can be devastating to a company. Due
to negative collateral consequences surrounding corporate
prosecutions, accused companies tend to yield to whatever demands
are made by DOJ during the negotiation. The fate of accounting firm
Arthur Andersen taught the business world the dangers of collateral
consequences surrounding corporate prosecutions. Specifically, as
part of the investigation into the failed business dealings of Enron,
the DOJ became aware that Enron's accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, shredded millions of documents relating to audits of
162. Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2006, at A14.
163. Erik Paulsen, note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1458 (2007).
164. Id.
165. Novack, supra note 2.
166. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1005 (Nov. 30,
2010) (statement of Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1I1shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66921.pdf.
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Enron's accounting practices.167 In March of 2002, Arthur Andersen
was indicted on charges of obstruction of justice.'68
Many
commentators have suggested it was the mere indictment of Arthur
Andersen that led to its closing-in the end, 28,000 people lost their
jobs from one of the world's oldest and largest accounting firms.169
It quickly became clear that while regulators needed to take
action in order to bring wrongdoers to justice, the regulators also
needed to be aware of and consider the collateral consequences of
such a corporate prosecution. As one commentator puts it:
[T]here is no question that criminal prosecution
of a corporation has a tremendous impact on the
corporation and its community, employees, customers
and lenders. For starters, the tangible and intangible
costs of responding to any corporate criminal
investigation are significant.
Company employees
must gather thousands of documents in response to
subpoenas. Prior to supplying subpoenaed documents,
legal counsel must review each document to verify
compliance and to ensure that privileged information
is not being released. This process is time consuming
and expensive.
In addition, any company under
investigation should undertake its own internal
investigation. If outside counsel is hired to do this
investigation, the legal fees are large. If in-house
counsel undertakes the investigation, counsel is
diverted from other corporate projects and tasks and
this diversion hurts a company in small and large ways.
Also, once the existence of an investigation becomes
public, stock prices of publicly traded companies often
drop, sometimes precariously....
Additionally, lenders may raise short term
interest rates, terminate lines of credit, or call in loans.
Moreover, business is often disrupted by an
investigation. Deals and plans are put on hold because
of the uncertainty surrounding the targeted company.
167. Ken Brown ct al., Called to Account: Indictment of Andersen in Shredding Case Puts Its
Futurein Question, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at Al, A4.
168. Indictment at 7, United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, No. CRH-02-121 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 7, 2002).
169. See generally Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411 (2007).
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Employee morale plummets. Competing businesses
swoop in and lure away star employees who are
reluctant to remain with a business under
investigation. Customers leave for competitors.7 0
In short, that commentator concludes a company simply might
not survive the costs and damage to both business and reputation that
Pretrial
can result from a corporate criminal investigation."'
diversion agreements (such as DPAs and NPAs) can provide an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism that punishes a company
but avoids the collateral damage to those who played no role in the
criminal conduct. For a corporate entity, then, receiving a DPA or
NPA rather than an outright prosecution can literally mean the
difference between life and death. As one commentator puts it: "A
company does not just want to avoid prosecution-it may need to
avoid prosecution in order to save itself."1 7 2 Clearly, the DOJ's power
in awarding DPAs and NPAs rather than prosecuting is very real.
For corporations, the impact of their vulnerability to mere
indictment (as opposed to indictment plus conviction)"' is that
corporations usually cannot risk going to trial.174 This helps explain
why, in the last twenty years, only a handful of companies have
decided to go to trial in an FCPA case.17 1 While federal prosecutors
170. Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1287, 1288 (2007).
171. Id.
172. See Paulsen, supra note 163, at 1455 (emphasis added). But cf. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur
Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: CorporateCriminal Convictions in the
Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PENN. J. Bus. L. 797 (2013) (determining through use of the
database of organizational convictions made publicly available by Professor Brandon Garrett
that no publicly traded company failed because of a conviction in the years 2001 to 2010).
173. Id. at 1456 ("IMlcre indictment can put a company in a tremendously vulnerable
position: Stock prices plummet, lines of credit dry up, and clients are scared off.").
174. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 169, at 426. See also Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation,
Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 825 (2011) (stating that "firms feel they
must accept" settlements); Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope or
Guilty Plea by Another Name?, INSIDE LITIG., Winter 2006, at 4 ("Given the breadth of the
corporate criminal liability doctrine and the potentially devastating consequences of a criminal
conviction or even indictment, it is the rare corporation today that has a meaningful right to a
jury trial in the resolution of its corporate criminal disputes with the government"); Jon May,
Feature: The New British Invasion: Will the UK Bribery Act of 2010 Eclipse the FCPA?, 63
CHAMPION 28, 31 (2012) (". . . the ugly truth is that while the existence of nonprosecution and
deferred prosecution agreements can be welcome alternatives to an indictment, combined with
a virtually strict liability regime, they can also permit the government to exact millions of dollars
in fines from companies that are genuinely without fault but cannot afford to take the risk of an
adverse outcome if they take on the government.").
175. See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically
Resolved? FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#ql6 (last visited Apr. 4,
2014) ("Nearly every FCPA enforcement action against a company in this era of FCPA
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enjoy wide, largely non-reviewable discretion regarding which
corporate entities to target and what crimes to allege,'7 6 the most
effective way for any criminal justice system to test such prosecutorial
discretion and to rein in overly-aggressive prosecutors-namely, the
trial by jury"'-is not being utilized to resolve FCPA cases. One
commentator puts it thusly: "Without the threat of trial . .. there is no
assurance that the prosecutor is acting in a judicious manner.""
Another commentator is even more blunt:
[B]ecause of the draconian consequences of
indictment, which often include the downfall of an
entire business, corporate entities have little practical
choice when faced with either indictment or accepting
a DPA.
Hence, the government has enormous
leverage in negotiating terms of DPAs, which has
resulted in prosecutorial overreaching and deals which
are unfair for corporate entities.179
Given that corporations cannot run the risk of going to trial, they
essentially do not have a Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement ("BATNA") 18 in their negotiations with the DOJ; in
other words, they have little choice but to accept whatever terms are
offered through the form of a DPA or NPA. 18'
Indeed, one
commentator argues that the government's power in the negotiation
process amounts to both economic duress and procedural
unconscionability, stating:
enforcement is resolved through a non-prosecution agreement ('NPA') or a deferred
prosecution agreement ('DPA')").
176. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("So long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.").
177. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose of a jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.")(citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
178. Paulsen, supra note 163, at 1457.
179. Senko, supra note 151, at 163-64.
180. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 100 (1991) (defining BATNA as "the standard against
which any proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can
protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it
would be in your interest to accept"). See generally CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT (2009).
181. See Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1885 ("The corporate offender's unique vulnerability to
adverse publicity and collateral consequences . . . calls into question whether the choice to enter
into deferral is really a choice at all.").
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It is indeed a Hobson's choice between indictment,
which amounts to corporate death, and an inequitable
agreement that at least allows the business to subsist.
Thus, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation
and entrance into DPAs clearly seem to satisfy all of
the elements of economic duress. *** The gross
inequality in bargaining power combined with
obviously one-sided terms also clearly evince
This inequality in bargaining
unconscionability.
power, which is derived from the government's ability
to indict and destroy a firm, is the impetus behind
economic duress and also militates toward finding
procedural unconscionability. 182
That same commentator goes on to argue that specific terms
typically included by the DOJ in DPAs and NPAs (such as mandating
a corporation to exhibit broad cooperation in negotiating and
carrying out the agreement, or allowing itself-the DOJ-to
unilaterally declare a breach in the agreement without judicial
oversight) are "substantively unconscionable" because such terms
"result in an imbalance in the obligations" imposed in the
agreement.183
Professors Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser taught us
nearly thirty-five years ago that parties do not bargain "in a vacuum"
and that two essential ingredients of power within the context of legal
negotiations include: (1) the option of going to trial should the
negotiation fail to achieve agreement; and (2) knowledge of what the
likely outcome would be, in accordance with legal precedent, should
one ultimately choose to go to trial. As the professors write in their
seminal work, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce:
Divorcing parents do not bargain ... in a vacuum; they

bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules
governing alimony, child support, marital property,
and custody give each parent certain claims based on
what each would get if the case went to trial. In other
words, the outcome that the law will impose if no
agreement is reached gives each parent certain
bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts. . . . In
182. Senko, supra note 151, at 180.
183. Id.
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negotiations under this regime, neither spouse would
ever consent to a division that left him or her worse off
than if he or she insisted on going to court.1"
And yet, corporations facing FCPA charges lack both of these
essential ingredients of power: (1) as pointed out previously, going to
trial would be so damaging to the company that it has little choice but
to accept whatever terms are offered through the form of a DPA or
NPA; and (2) because so few FCPA cases have gone to trial, it is very
difficult for companies to accurately predict what the outcome at trial
would likely be if they decide to pursue that avenue. The end result is
that the balance of power in the context of FCPA pretrial
negotiations is weighted significantly in favor of the government.
C.

THE COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES DEFENSE:
COUNTERBALANCE?

A POSSIBLE

A number of legal experts and commentators-including two
former U.S. Attorney Generals and other high-ranking government
officials who dealt directly with FCPA enforcement issues-have
argued that one way to counterbalance the DOJ's seemingly allencompassing power in this area is to enact a "compliance procedures
defense" to the FCPA.1 5
Those who support a "compliance defense" in the context of the
FCPA are simply saying this: A company's preexisting compliance
policies and procedures (i.e., policies and procedures that are in place
and in practice before a corporate entity is charged with an FCPA
violation), as well as the company's good-faith efforts to comply with
the FCPA, should be relevant as a matter of law when an employee
or agent acts contrary to those policies and procedures and thereby

184. Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979).
185. See Mike Koehler, Add Alberto Gonzalez To The List Of Former High-Ranking DOJ
Officials Who Support An FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/add-alberto-gonzalez-to-the-list-of-former-high-ranking-doj-offici
als-who-support-an-fcpa-compliance-defense (discussing the "growing chorus of former DOJ
officials" who support a compliance defense, including two former U.S. Attorney Generals
(Michael Mukasey and Alberto Gonzalez), a former Deputy Attorney General (Larry
Thompson), a former Chief of the DOJ's FCPA Unit (Joseph Covington), and a former highprofile corporate crime prosecutor (Andrew Weissmann)) [hereinafter Koehler, Alberto
Gonzalez]. For a more thorough discussion of why each of these individuals supports a
compliance defense, see Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance

Defense, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 609, 651-54 (2012) [hereinafter Koehler, Revisitingl.
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violates the law. 18
Moreover, it's not just the FCPA that corporate entities have to
worry about as they conduct business throughout the world. Rather,
there is a wide variety of criminal law exposure based on respondeat
superior principles, despite whatever preexisting compliance policies
and procedures the businesses might have in place, and despite
whatever good-faith efforts the businesses might make to comply with
the various laws. (Of course, while it's not provided for in the
criminal context, corporations do have the benefit of a "good faith"
affirmative defense when facing respondeat superior civil liability in
tort.)18
Over the years, commentators have argued in favor of a general
compliance defense to corporate liability in the criminal context. For
example, Professors Richard Gruner and Louis Brown have argued
that a "generally applicable due diligence defense" could be
afforded to corporations in prosecutions based on
offenses by their employees. Due diligence in this
context would be shown if a corporation initiated and
maintained an effective law compliance program
under which the employee offense under prosecution
was a rare and aberrant one. Firms would be
rewarded with an immunity from liability for the good
faith efforts of their managers to establish effective
law compliance programs.1is
Along these same lines, commentators have proposed a
corporate due diligence defense if a firm can demonstrate: (1) "the
illegal conduct had been clearly and convincingly forbidden," and (2)
"reasonable safeguards designed to prevent corporate crimes had
been developed and implemented, including regular procedures for

186. See generally Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 185, at 611.
187. Consider, for example, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), in
which the Supreme Court examined vicarious employer liability for alleged sexual harassment
by a supervisor. In deciding whether employers could offer an affirmative defense, the Court
stated that the defense "comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id. at 765. See also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (applying the same standard set forth
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth).
188. Richard S. Gruner and Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and
Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 731, 764 (1996) (citation
omitted).

Summer 2014

NEGOTIATING BRIBERY

385

evaluation, detection, and remedy.""
Professor Ellen Podgor argues it is important in a "post-Arthur
Andersen world" to protect law abiding employees, shareholders, and
corporate entities from the negative consequences of being held
criminally liable "when good faith efforts have been made to
constrain rogue employees."1" Podgor concludes that providing a
"'good faith' affirmative defense" to corporations that have adhered
to the law in "structuring, overseeing, and maintaining" their
compliance programs will offer an additional incentive to
corporations to widely promote such programs. 191
The Model Penal Code proposes to limit corporate liability to
those instances in which "the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated
by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting on
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment."l 92
A similar standard has been advocated by Andrew Weissmann,
the former director of the DOJ's Enron Task Force, arguing
corporate liability should be permitted only if a company "reasonably
should have taken steps to detect and deter the criminal action of its
employee."193 Says Weissmann:
A standard of corporate criminal liability that is tied to
whether the company has taken all reasonable steps to
prevent and detect crime by its employees would
strongly incentivize meaningful and necessary selfregulation. A company that sought to avoid criminal
prosecution would have strong reasons to implement
an effective compliance program, both to deter
criminal activity at the outset and to use as a shield in
the event criminality nevertheless occurred. 194
The notion of including some sort of compliance defense under
the FCPA first appeared in 1983, just six years after the law first
passed. While the bill being considered by Congress to reform the
189. See Charles R. Ncsson, Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1257-58 (1979).
190. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates A "Good Faith" Affirmative
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1537, 1543 (2007).
191. Id.
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
193. Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to CorporateCriminal Liability, 44 AM.CRIM. L.
REV. 1319, 1335 (2007).
194. Weissmann, supra note 193, at 1335.
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FCPA did not contain a compliance defense, one of the hearing
witnesses suggested that such a reform might be worthwhile. Arthur
Matthews, a former SEC enforcement official then in private practice,
stated the following in his testimony:
I would also support some type of affirmative due
diligence defense that a corporation would be able to
prove to avoid criminal responsibility on a reckless
disregard theory. Since 1933, in the Securities Act of
1933, there has been a due diligence defense for
issuers and their officers and directors with respect to
whether or not a registration statement is false. I think
comparable language could be placed in the bill so that
corporations would have an affirmative due diligence
defense.195
Matthews' testimony might have planted the seed for a
compliance defense under the FCPA. Three years after he testified
before Congress, an FCPA reform bill was introduced by
Representative Don Bonker of Washington State that included such a
provision. 1 96 Entitled the Export Enhancement Act of 1986, Title IV
of the Act stated:
Due Diligence.-An issuer [or domestic concern]
may not be held vicariously liable, either civilly or
criminally, for a violation [of the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions] by its employee, who is not an officer or
director, if such issuer [or domestic concern] has
established procedures, which would reasonably be
expected to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable,
any such violation by such employee, and the officer
and employee of the issuer [or domestic concern] with
supervisory responsibility for the conduct of the
employee used due diligence to prevent the
commission of the offense by that employee. Such
issuer [or domestic concern] shall have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it
meets the requirements set forth in paragraphs (1) and
(2). The first sentence of this subsection shall be
considered an affirmative defense to actions under
195. The Foreign Trade PracticesAct: Hearings on H.R. 2157 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Econ. Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 226 (1983) (statement of
Arthur F. Matthews, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering LLP).
196. See H.R. REP. No. 99-580, pt. 1 (1986).
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[the anti-bribery provisions].197
The House Report summarizing the bill stated that if a
corporation "has set up internal controls to avoid illicit payments or
has otherwise acted to keep within the law, its 'due diligence' can be
used as a defense against both civil and criminal liability in cases
where its employees have nonetheless engaged in bribery." 9
However, while that legislative bill and similar ones contained
provisions for a compliance defense,19 9 the legislation that was
ultimately agreed upon and signed into law after several years of
political and legislative wrangling-the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988-did not contain a compliance

defense. 200
Since that time, the business community has become increasingly
energized to support the enactment of a compliance defense under
the FCPA.
Indeed, starting in 2010, a lobbying campaign
spearheaded by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal
Reform has been strongly advocating such a change to the FCPA. 20 1
In Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 2 2 the first reform put forth by the Chamber is that of
adding a compliance defense, or "a defense that would permit
companies to fight the imposition of criminal liability for FCPA
violations, if the individual employees or agents had circumvented
compliance measures that were otherwise reasonable in identifying
and preventing such violations."2 03
The Chamber argues that while certain benefits can accrue to a
company that implements a strong FCPA compliance program, (such

197. H.R. REP. No. 99-580, at 66.
198. Id. at 9.
199. See, e.g., H.R. 4848, introduced by Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri,
entitled The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. The House Report summarizing
H.R. 4848 stated the bill establishes "a new, 'due diligence' defense for civil and criminal
liability of issuers and domestic concerns for violations of the FCPA by employees and agents.
It provides that if the issuer or domestic concern has established procedures for detecting
violations, and if the officers and employees with supervisory responsibility for the employees or
agent violating the law have exercised due diligence to prevent the violation, then no vicarious
liability will apply. . .. " H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 78 (1987).
200. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-03,
102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25.
201. See Boyd, supra note 90.
202. ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2010), available at http://
openairblog.files.wordpress. com/2011/10/us-chamber-of-comm-amending-the-fcpa.pdf.
203. WEISSMANN,supra note 202, at 11.
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as a greater likelihood of being offered an NPA or DPA, 204 or a
greater likelihood of receiving smaller penalties if the company is
convicted of a criminal offense 205), the problem is that such benefits
are subject to prosecutorial discretion.206 Indeed, Michael Mukasey,
who was U.S. Attorney General from 2007 to 2009, testifies to the
following at the June 2011 House hearing:
It is true that the DOJ or SEC may look more
favorably on a company with a strong FCPA
compliance program when determining whether to
charge the company or what settlement terms to offer,
and such compliance programs may be taken into
account by a court at the sentencing of a corporation
convicted of an FCPA violation. However, such
benefits

are

subject to

unlimited prosecutorial

discretion, are available only after the liability phase of
a prosecution, or both. There is also no guarantee that
a strong compliance program will be given the weight

it deserves. 207

By contrast, the U.K.'s Bribery Act of 2010 passed by the British
Parliament provides a specific defense to liability if a corporation can
show that it has "adequate procedures" in place to detect and deter
improper conduct. 20 8 Under Section 7 of the Act, a "commercial
organization [sic] will have a full defence [sic] if it can show that
despite a particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate
procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it from

bribing." 209

The U.K. Ministry of Justice believes that "no policies or
procedures are capable of detecting and preventing all bribery" 21 0 and
that "no bribery prevention regime will be capable of preventing

204. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/cousa/foia-rcading-room/usam/title9/28merm.htm.
205. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012).
206. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 202, at 11.
207. See Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism
and Homeland Security, H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (2011) (statement of
Michael B. Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/_files/hearings/pdflMukasey06l4201 1.pdf (emphasis added).
208. WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 202, at 11. See also Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2)
(Eng.), availableat http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_- 20100023_en.pdf.
209. U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 15 (2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
210. U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 209, at 7.
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bribery at all times."211 According to the Ministry of Justice, "the
objective of the [Bribery] Act is not to bring the full force of the
criminal law to bear upon well run commercial organizations [sic] that
experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf."2 12
Moreover, there are numerous other OECD Convention signatory
countries besides the U.K. that incorporate a compliance defense into
their anti-bribery laws, including Australia, Chile, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and

Switzerland. 2 13

There are those who support the implementation of a similar
defense under the FCPA,214 as well as those who oppose it. 2 15
Whatever the political, economic, or other reasons preventing the
U.S. Congress from incorporating an FCPA compliance defense
heretofore, legislation for such a defense could easily be worded in a
manner that avoids the core criticism cited by its strongest
opponents 216-namely, that a compliance defense would protect acts
of FCPA wrongdoing by corporate officers and directors that are

"knowing" 217 and "corruptly" 21 8 undertaken with intent, 2 19 thereby
211. Id. at 8.

212. U.K.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,supra note 209, at 8.
213. For a description of each country's compliance defense, see Kochler, Revisiting, supra
note 185, at 638-45.
214. See Koehler, Alberto Gonzalez, supra note 185. The list of former DOJ officials who
support a compliance defense includes two former Attorney Generals (Michael Mukasey and
Alberto Gonzalez), a former Deputy Attorney General (Larry Thompson), a former Chief of the
Justice Department's FCPA Unit (Joseph Covington), and a former high-profile corporate crime
prosecutor (Andrew Weissmann). Scholars have also grappled with the issue, sometimes more
directly (see, e.g, Podgor, supra note 190; Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 185) and sometimes in
more tangential ways (see, e.g., Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility
for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468
(1988); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, CorporateCompliance Programsas a Shield to Criminal
Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 689 (1995); V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996);
William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, CorporateCrime and Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1307 (2007); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based
Liabilityfor the Complicit Corporation,44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343 (2007)).
215. In January, 2012, more than thirty civil society and business groups sent a letter to every
member of the U.S. Congress expressing their opposition to any legislative efforts to amend the
FCPA. The signatories included, among others, Amnesty International, Calvert Investments,
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, EarthRights International, Global
Financial Integrity, Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Jubilee USA Network, Open Society Policy Center, Oxfam America,
Revenue Watch Institute, and Transparency International USA. This letter is available at
http://www.transparency-usa.org/documents/2012FCPACoalitionPressRelease FINAL.pdf See
also OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS., BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2011) (arguing that the FCPA should not be amended).
216. See generally OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS., supra note 215.
217. The FCPA defines "knowing" as follows: (2) (A) A person's state of mind is "knowing"
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completely undermining the FCPA.220 In order to avoid that
outcome, any compliance defense passed by Congress should not
allow the protection of corporate leadership from their own knowing
and intentional wrongdoing under the FCPA, but, rather, should be
designed in a narrow and targeted fashion to protect companies from
rogue employees who commit FCPA crimes despite company efforts to
prevent such crimes.

Indeed, even the Export Enhancement Act of 1986 (discussed
supra), in defining "due diligence," stated that a company would be
protected from civil and criminally liability only for FCPA violations
made by employees who are not officers or directors of the

company.221 That legislation, although never signed into law,
intentionally and specifically disallowed protection of a company
from FCPA civil or criminal liability if the wrongdoers were either
officers or directors within the company.
The drafters of that 1986 legislation were on the right track; any
with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if (i) such person is aware that such person is
engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially
certain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such
result is substantially certain to occur. (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular
circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that
such circumstance does not exist." Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1(f)(2)(a) and (b).
218. The FCPA does not explicitly define "corruptly," but in drafting the statute, Congress
adopted the meaning ascribed to the same term in the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §
201(b). See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 7, which states in full:
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer,
payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to
the payor or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, or
to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function. The word
"corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required under
18 U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b),
the word "corruptly" indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influence
the recipient. It does not require that the act (be) fully consummated or
succeed in producing the desired outcome.
219. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78ff. See also Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland
Security, H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (2011) (statement of Michael B. Mukasey,
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hear
ings/pdf/Mukasey0614201l.pdf (stating that the statutory language of the FCPA requires
"evidence of knowledge and intent for liability").
220. See OPEN SOC'Y FOUNDS., supra note 215, at 31 ("Creating a 'compliance defense' to
knowing and intentional violations of the Act would amount to eliminating criminal liability
under the Act all together by permitting a 'fig leaf' compliance program to insulate companies
from knowing and intentional wrong-doing.").
221. See H.R. REP. No. 99-580, pt. 1, at 66 (1986).
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reasonable, modern-day compliance defense law should follow suit
and work to insulate companies from FCPA civil and criminal liability
only with respect to lower level, rogue employees who are not officers
or directors within the business. Not only would such legislation
increase FCPA compliance by providing the leadership of a business
with strong incentives to implement policies and programs to identify
current (and deter future) violations,2 22 but it would also provide
corporations with some protection against aggressive prosecutors who
can otherwise exploit the power imbalance inherent in the current

FCPA statute. 2 3
D.

MIGHT THE COURTS BECOME MORE INVOLVED?

1.

Judicialreview of proposedprosecutionagreement terms

The federal government decides whether to prosecute a given
corporate entity based upon a careful review and consideration of the
Principles of Prosecution. The Principles are merely guidelines; they
create no legal rights for corporate defendants, and there is little in
the way of procedural protection available to companies subject to
NPAs and DPAs, unless the company chooses to reject the
agreement and instead submit to a criminal indictment.2 2 4
Furthermore, NPAs are not filed with a court and are therefore
not subject to judicial approval or scrutiny.225 Courts do not even
222. See Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 185, at 659 ("[It is reasonable to conclude that an
FCPA compliance defense will cause more organizations with robust FCPA compliance policies
and procedures to disclose rogue employee conduct to the enforcement agencies."). See aLso
Mike Koehler, An Examination of Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Issues, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L.
& Bus. 317, 372 (2013) ("An FCPA compliance defense is the best incentive for more robust
corporate compliance as it can help reduce improper conduct and thus best advance the FCPA's
objective of reducing bribery.").
223. See WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 202, at 13.
224. See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary
Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLICY 167, 170 (2004). Given that the Principles of
Prosecution are a part of the United States Attorneys' Manual, the following disclaimer found
in the Manual's introduction underscores that the document serves to merely guide rather than
to create substantive or procedural rights for the parties involved:
The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is
not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter
civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful
litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008), available at http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
225. Koehler, supra note 69, at 934, 937.

392

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 10:2

review an NPA's statement of facts to determine if there is sufficient
evidence to satisfy the elements of the crimes alleged by DOJ.22 6
Because DPAs, on the other hand, are filed with a court, such
agreements are subject to judicial scrutiny. However, as one
commentator explains, not only has a U.S. Government
Accountability Office report found that judges largely fail to provide
any review or oversight of DPAs,227 but the statement of facts put
forth in such agreements are "often bare-bones and replete with legal
conclusions. "228
Ensuring judicial review of the terms of DPA and NPA
agreements before the agreements are signed could mitigate or
eliminate many of the concerns brought up in this article.
Specifically, judicial oversight could help: (1) neutralize the
unbalanced negotiating leverage that seems to favor the DOJ;229 (2)
look out for the employees whose attorney-client and/or workproduct privileges can potentially be compromised during the
negotiation process; and (3) look out for the investors who tend to
bear the brunt of monetary penalties imposed on the corporation
through DPAs and NPAs.
While application of judicial review could be accomplished by
the passage of new legislation explicitly requiring judicial approval of
NPAs and DPAs, it could also be accomplished by simply finding a
textual mandate in the Speedy Trial Act, the legislation which enables
the filing of DPAs. 230 The Act states there are exceptions for
specified delays in filing information, including delays "during which
prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant
to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the
court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his
good conduct." 231 The language "with the approval of the court"
226. Id. at 935.
227. Id. (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 25 (2009), available at http://www.
gao.gov/assets/ 300/299781.pdf).
228. Koehler, supra note 69, at 934.
229. See Daniel R. Wilson, Note, Administrative Procedure and Foreign Antibribery
Enforcement: "Restoring Balance" Through Procedural Transparency, 36 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 289, 303 (2013) (arguing that the "primary flaw" of NPAs and DPAs is that
there is "no binding procedure on the government to take into account valid contentions" put
forth by defendants .... Judicial review could address this by "help[ing] to add transparency to
the settlement process and enable corporate defendants to put forth these counterpoints
without fear of DOJ retribution").
230. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2010).

231. See id. at § 3161(h)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
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could be interpreted broadly as a mandate for judicial approval.
Indeed, in the matter of United States v. HSBC Bank USA, that very
interpretation is made by U.S. District Court Judge John Gleeson of
the Eastern District of New York (discussed more thoroughly, infra).
Specifically, the judge rules that a "plain reading" of the provision
would allow for the creation of a DPA, "but only upon approval of
the agreement by the court."2 32
Interestingly, despite the fact that the Speedy Trial Act grants
the judiciary approval rights for NPAs and DPAs,23 3 nearly every
NPA and DPA that the government has negotiated with a U.S.
company has been approved without judicial modification.2 34
According to one commentator, it is the absence of judicial scrutiny
that "allows the DOJ to command the outcome of any negotiation
and ultimately creates an illusion of choice whereby businesses end
up adopting government-stamped settlement agreements." 2 35
While this article is proposing increased judicial review, it is
important that the judge's role in reviewing NPAs or DPAs not
interfere with the prosecutor's role in making the initial charging
decision and in drafting the text of the agreement. After all, the
Constitution grants prosecutors wide discretion in assisting the
President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."2 36 This
gives prosecutors the exclusive power to choose to indict or to enter
into an agreement such as an NPA or DPA; furthermore, courts
"presume that [the prosecutors] have properly discharged their
official duties" in making those decisions.2 37 Thus, effective judicial
review does not require reviewing (or interfering with) a charging

232. HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 5-6. The judge notes that his interpretation is
supported by the legislative history of the provision. ("The Report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Speedy Trial Act states that this provision 'assures that the court will be
involved in the decision to divert and that the procedure will not be used by prosecutors and
defense counsel to avoid the speedy trial time limits."') (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 37 (1974)).
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2010) ("The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing
the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: . . . (2) Any period of delay
during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written
agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.").
234. See Koehler, supra note 69, at 935-36.
235. Pete J. Georgis, Settling With Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention is Needed to
Curb an Expanding Interpretationof the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 243, 275 (2012) (citation omitted).
236. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
237. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
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decision; nor does it require dictating the terms of an NPA or DPA.
Rather, courts would play merely a reviewing role by approving or
rejecting a completed agreement immediately after it has been
drafted, but before it has been signed by the parties involved.238
With increased judicial review, not only would there be a more
reasonable balance of power between prosecutors and corporations
during the negotiation phase of NPA and DPA deal making, but
companies would be provided with guidance on how some of the
more vague FCPA provisions, (such as where the law stands
regarding the definition of "foreign official"), will be construed by the
courts.2 39 Moreover, judicial review would ensure that the DOJ's
claims and theories of corporate wrongdoing actually stand on firm
legal ground. 24 0 Essentially, reviewing judges would help to locate
and define that heretofore elusive line separating lawful from
unlawful conduct, thereby providing more certainty in both FCPA
compliance and enforcement.
Currently, most agreements fail to explain (1) whether (and how)
the defendant's conduct satisfies the elements of the crime and (2)
whether there is proper legal precedent to punish the defendant.
Instead, NPAs and DPAs tend to recite legal conclusions. 241 If
judicial review were incorporated into the process as this article
proposes, then, after prosecutors and defendants finish negotiating
the terms of an agreement, the court could review all the evidence,
admitted facts, and legal analyses to ensure the conclusions and terms
of the agreement are reasonable, 24 2 legally supportable, 243 and fair to
238. See Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1898-99 (2005).
239. See Paul F. Enzinna, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Aggressive Enforcement and
Lack of JudicialReview Create Uncertain Terrain for Businesses, MANHATrAN INSTITUTE FOR
POLICY RESEARCH, Issue Brief No. 17, Jan. 2013 (arguing that Congress should clarify the
definition of "foreign official," specifically "the extent to which the FCPA applies to low-level
employees of state-owned enterprises. The economic emergence of formerly Communist
countries and of the still formally Communist China has led to a proliferation of state-owned
enterprises with which American companies must do business in order to compete globally.").
240. See Yockey, supra note 174, at 825 (noting that a lack of judicial scrutiny of FCPA
agreements allows federal prosecutors to assert broad and vague theories of liability); see also
2010 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements,
GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 4, 2011), http://gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/201OYear-EndUpdateCorporateDeferredProsecution AndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.aspx (noting that because
NPA and DPA agreements receive scant judicial scrutiny, the government tends to take
expansive and untested legal positions).
241. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 12CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-dpa.pdf (DPA agreement providing only legal conclusions that
the FCPA had been violated).
242. In determining whether an agreement is "reasonable," the court can assess whether
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both the parties and the general public. 2 44 Only after the court's
review and approval would the NPA or DPA become an enforceable

agreement. 245
This idea is not a new one. In fact, in the United Kingdom, new
legislation for Deferred Prosecution Agreements incorporates a final
hearing into the DPA negotiation process wherein the court must
give final approval to the DPA. Specifically, when a prosecutor and a
person whom the prosecutor is considering prosecuting "have agreed
the terms of a DPA, the prosecutor must apply to the Crown Court
for a declaration that: (a) the DPA is in the interest of justice, and (b)

DOJ's legal interpretations are consistent with congressional intent and statutory construction
of the FCPA. See Julia Di Vito, note, The New Meaning of New ProcessSteel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 323 (2011). Although courts are bound to provide deference to the
government's legal interpretations in FCPA matters, it is important for the judiciary to review
the negotiated NPA and DPA agreements given that one of the parties, the prosecutor, clearly
has a bargaining advantage. Such a review serves as a critical check on the power of the
prosecutor, preventing him or her from unilaterally expanding the interpretation of any
provision of the FCPA. See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred ProsecutionRacket, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 28, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160 .html (suggesting that
diversion agreements have the power to erode "the most elementary protections of the criminal
law, by turning the prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our principles of
separation of powers").
243. Other commentators have called for judicial review of FCPA diversion agreements; some
have even begun to sketch out what such a review process would entail. See, e.g., Pete J. Georgis,
Settling With Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention is Needed to Curb an Expanding
Interpretationof the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 243, 277 (2012)
("As part of its review process, a federal court should demand detailed information as to how the
admitted facts violate the specific provisions of the Act. This information should include (1) the
specific portions of the FCPA alleged to have been violated, (2) the factual assertions supporting
the government's allegation of corporate wrongdoing, (3) how the admitted facts prove that each
element of the relevant FCPA provisions has been violated, and (4) the legal precedents
supporting the agency's interpretation of the FCPA and its elements."). For additional thoughts
on figuring out an applicable standard of review for FCPA agreement matters, see SEC v.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., where the court determined that the applicable standard of review
for a settlement of securities fraud charges is "whether the proposed Consent judgment . .. is fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest." SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
244. Using its discretion, a court can evaluate whether the agreement is fair to both the
parties and to the general public. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d
328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) ("Before the Court determines whether the settlement is fair,
it must ask a preliminary question: fair to whom? ... The answer is, fair to the parties and to the
public") (emphasis original).
245. The idea for judicial review of diversion agreements is not a new one. See Robert
Plotkin et al., A New Era of Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement: FCPA and UK Bribery Act
Spur a Worldwide Focus on Corruption Prevention, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2012) (noting that the
director of the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom does not advocate a U.S.-style
system in which prosecutors and corporations enter into private agreements. Rather, the
director suggests that judicial review and oversight within the UK's process is central, arguing
that "only a judge can decide whether the terms are appropriate").
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the terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate."24 6
Moreover, U.S. District Court Judge John Gleeson of the
Eastern District of New York appears to concur fully that judges have
a role to play in reviewing DPA agreements. In United States v.
HSBC Bank USA, the Judge Gleeson wrote that "[b]y placing a
criminal matter on the docket of a federal court, the parties have
subjected their DPA to the legitimate exercise of that court's
authority." 247 Specifically, he ruled the court has authority to approve
and oversee the implementation of the DPA pursuant to its
"supervisory power."248 Quoting extensively from Justice Louis
Brandeis, the court noted the importance of the supervisory power in
"preserv[ing] the judicial process from contamination." 249 Judge
Gleeson reasoned that "the supervisory power serves to ensure that
the courts do not lend a judicial imprimatur to any aspect of a
criminal proceeding that smacks of lawlessness and impropriety."250
Judge Gleeson went on to say that since the parties requested a
ruling regarding the Speedy Trial Act,
the contracting parties have chosen to implicate the
Court in their resolution of this matter. There is
nothing wrong with that, but a pending federal
criminal case is not window dressing. Nor is the Court,
to borrow a famous phrase, a potted plant. By placing
a criminal matter on the docket of a federal court, the
parties have subjected their DPA to the legitimate
exercise of that court's authority. 251
While asserting this judicial role, however, the judge was careful
to distinguish a DPA from an NPA, which he said falls within the
government's "absolute discretion to decide not to prosecute" 25 2 and
246. UK Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c. 22) Schedule 17, Part 1, paragraph 8 (1) (emphasis
added).
247. HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 10.
248. Id. at 6, 10. Specifically, the Court states: This Court has authority to approve or reject
the DPA pursuant to its supervisory power. "The supervisory power ... permits federal courts
to supervise 'the administration of criminal justice' among the parties before the bar." United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
340 (1943)); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[E]very United States court has an inherent supervisory authority over the
proceedings conducted before it. . . .").
HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 6-7.
249. HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 8 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
250. Id. at 10.
251. HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 10 (internal citation omitted).
252. Id. at 9 (citing ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987))
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so "is not the business of the courts." 253 The critical feature of a DPA
making it susceptible to judicial review, according to Judge Gleeson,
is that it involves pending criminal charges, requiring oversight and
review to protect "the integrity of the Court." 25 4
In the end, Judge Gleeson approved the DPA "without
hesitation," noting that "much of what might have been accomplished
by a criminal conviction has been agreed to in the DPA." 2 55 He
further ordered the government and HSBC to file quarterly reports
keeping the court "apprised of all significant developments in the
implementation of the DPA." 256
An analysis of the particular settlement terms in this case goes
beyond the scope of this article; the key development is that a sitting
federal district court judge argued forcefully, and convincingly, through
his ruling that courts do indeed have an important role to play in
reviewing and overseeing DPA agreements. Several practicing white
collar defense lawyers argue that Judge Gleeson's decision
"introduces -seemingly for the first time-a doctrinal framework for
judicial scrutiny of the resolution of a criminal case under a DPA. By
invoking the court's 'supervisory power' as a basis to approve and
oversee the implementation of a DPA, he treads new ground." 257
Furthermore, although Judge Gleeson concludes in his decision
that NPAs are "not the business of the courts," 25 8 an argument could
be made otherwise. Specifically, while courts do not have the right to
interfere with a prosecutor's discretion on whether or not to
prosecute, (i.e., whether or not to resolve the matter by using an
("[I]t is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review.").
253. Id. (citing Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, on Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and NonProsecution Agreements with Corporations to Heads of Department Components and U.S.
Att'ys (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo03072008.pdf) ("In the non-prosecution agreement context, formal charges are not filed and the
agreement is maintained by the parties rather than being filed with a court.").
254. Id. at 11. The Court cites to United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 526 ("lOur] cases
have acknowledged the duty of reviewing courts to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process."); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 ("IT]he supervisory power serves the
'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity."); and Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 216, 222-23 (discussing "the imperative of judicial integrity" in invoking the
supervisory power). See HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 7-8.
255. Id. at 7-8.
256. Senko, supra note 151, at 178.
257. Steven E. Fagell, James M. Garland, & David M. Zionts, The HSBC DPA -Approved,
But At What Cost?, LAw360 (July 8, 2013), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publica
tion/a5ced455-cc43-40fl -80ff52485645fabb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dcd98cO7-6774fbc-9201-58e51dalc475/TheHSBCDPAApprovedButAtWhatCost.pdf.
258. HSBC Bank, No. 12 CR 763, slip op. at 9.
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NPA),29 courts do have the right, it could be argued, to judicially
review the terms of an NPA agreement after the prosecutor has
decided to use one in resolving the matter at hand. After all,
scrutinizing the terms of an agreement (in this case, an NPA) to
ensure those terms are reasonable, legally supportable, and fair is far
different from dictating to a prosecutor that he or she has no choice
but to resolve a given matter by using an NPA.
2.

Judicialreview of NPA and DPA agreement breaches

Most DPAs and NPAs include a term giving the prosecutor the
right to determine whether a breach of the agreement has occurred.
If the corporation breaches, the agreement is thereby revoked and
the corporation becomes subject to prosecution. 2 60 Moreover, there is
very little recourse for a corporation to contest the DOJ's
determination of breach, and it has no right to appeal the
determination to an independent, impartial judicial authority. For
example, DOJ's NPA with Ralph Lauren Corporation reads:
In the event that the Department determines that the
Company has breached this Agreement, the
Department agrees to provide the Company with
written notice of such breach prior to instituting any
prosecution resulting from such breach. The Company
shall, within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice,
have the opportunity to respond to the Department in
writing to explain the nature and circumstances of
such breach, as well as the actions the Company has
taken to address and remediate the situation, which
explanation the Department shall consider in
determining whether to institutea prosecution.26 1
This threat of unilateral revocation of the agreement increases
the leverage exercised by prosecutors. 262 Surely companies feel an

259. Judge Gleeson stated in his opinion that "a prosecutor's 'broad discretion rests largely
on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review."' Id.
at 14 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
260. Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing,96 KY. L.J. 1, 16 (2007).
261. Letter from Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney, & Jeffrey H. Knox, Chief of the Fraud Section
of the Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, on the Non-Prosecution Agreement between DOJ
and of the Ralph Lauren Corporation, (Apr. 22, 2013), available at httpJ/www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ralph-lauren/Ralph-Lauren.-NPA-Executed.pdf (emphasis added).
262. See Paulsen,supra note 163, at 1464.
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increased sense of pressure to cooperate with the DOJ throughout
the deferral period of the agreement, knowing that prosecutors have
the power to decide whether or not the terms of the agreement have
been met. In such a situation, prosecutors effectively become both
judge and jury over a corporation's criminal conduct.2 63
One
commentator argues that the "unfairness and one-sidedness" of such
an arrangement appears to be "blatantly unconscionable" and could
only be the product of economic duress, stating, "There is no other
reason for a corporate entity to subject itself to the final
determination of an authority that opposes its interests."21" It seems
clear that judicial review of the determination on whether or not a
prosecution agreement has been breached would offer some measure
of security to companies that are signatories to such agreements.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In resolving FCPA cases, the DOJ currently relies heavily upon
two ADR vehicles (NPAs and DPAs) that, although efficient and costeffective, can present certain weaknesses and challenges. In particular,
as was suggested throughout this article, the negotiation process by
which these agreements are created, refined, and implemented can be
unfair. In many instances, the government has too much power, too
much leverage, and too much discretion over the accused parties in
presenting, negotiating, and carrying out DPAs and NPAs. Moreover,
there is not enough transparency or consistency within the negotiation
processes involved, especially in the context of the FCPA. These
negotiations could become more balanced and fair by implementing
the six following recommendations:
A.

THE DOJ SHOULD RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC CAREFULLY
REDACTED INFORMATION REGARDING ALL FCPA
DECLINATION DECISIONS

In the FCPA "Resource Guide" 265 published jointly by the DOJ
and the SEC, there were six examples of actual matters in which the
agencies declined to pursue prosecution or enforcement action,
together with brief descriptions of the factors that influenced those
263. See Greenblum, supra note 3, at 1864 ("Deferral is a powerful prosecutorial tool
because it is negotiated and implemented exclusively by the prosecutor.").
264. See Senko, supra note 151, at 178.
265. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 8.
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declination decisions. Such disclosure should become a routine
practice for all declination decisions. One might argue that since the
agencies do not routinely provide information on declinations in
other types of cases (e.g., financial fraud, antitrust, and money
laundering), FCPA cases should not be treated any differently.
However, (1) publishing the six examples in the Resource Guide
shows how the information can be published in a manner that is not
damaging to the companies, i.e., without using company names or any
identifying information; and (2) while statutes targeting financial
fraud, antitrust, and money laundering have been extensively
construed by the courts, that is not the case for the FCPA. Thus, until
such a body of case law is developed, it is the opportunity to study
documents such as declination decisions that can provide the
guidance businesses need to successfully comply with the FCPA.
B.

FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASES SHOULD HAVE
GREATER PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

When the FCPA was enacted, the law directed the U.S. Attorney
General to establish a procedure to provide responses to inquiries by
those subject to the law regarding how a particular behavior or plan
of action might (or might not) conform with DOJ's "present
enforcement policy." 266 In other words, subjects of the law can write
in and get a sense, in the form of a DOJ Opinion Procedure Release,
of whether or not "specified, prospective-not hypotheticalconduct" would run afoul of the Act.267 While the DOJ makes the
opinions available through its web site, 268 the general public cannot
rely upon those opinions, as a matter of law, to protect themselves
from federal prosecution for engaging in similar conduct. Indeed,
every opinion specifically states that it "has no binding application to
any party which did not join in the request [of the opinion] .... "269
DOJ should change this policy. Specifically, the new policy could
mandate that if a particular Opinion Procedure Release states that
conduct X, Y, or Z discussed therein conforms with the FCPA, that
opinion is then entitled to a rebuttable presumption for any individual
266. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2011).
267. Id.
268. The Opinion Procedure Releases are available through the U.S. Department of Justice
website, at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/.
269. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE NO. 11-01, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpalopinion/.
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or company exhibiting the same conduct, whether they were a party to
the Opinion ProcedureRelease or not, should an enforcement action
later be brought as a result of the conduct discussed. If these opinions
had precedential value in this manner, they would be far more helpful
in giving guidance to other individuals and corporate entities trying to
stay within legal bounds vis-A-vis the FCPA. One might criticize this
idea by pointing out that neither IRS "private letter rulings" nor SEC
"no-action letters" can currently be relied upon for legal precedent.
However, it must be remembered that there are hundreds of judicial
opinions covering every aspect of the work done by those two
agencies, and those judicial opinions provide companies with
extensive guidance on the intricacies of IRS and SEC policies, rules,
and regulations-guidance that is currently in far shorter supply with
respect to the FCPA.
C.

THE U.S. CONGRESS SHOULD THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATE, IN

As NONPARTISAN A MANNER AS POSSIBLE, 270 THE
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PASSING AN

FCPA

COMPLIANCE DEFENSE

Whatever the political, economic, or other reasons preventing
the U.S. Congress from incorporating an FCPA compliance defense
heretofore, legislation for such a defense could easily be worded in a
manner that avoids the core criticism cited by its strongest
opponents. 27 1 Namely, a compliance defense would protect acts of
FCPA wrongdoing by corporate officers and directors that are
"knowing" and "corruptly" undertaken with intent, 2 72 thereby
completely undermining the FCPA.2 73
In order to avoid that
outcome, any compliance defense passed by Congress should not
attempt to insulate corporate leadership from their own knowing and
intentional wrongdoing under the FCPA, but, rather, should be
designed in a narrow and targeted fashion to protect companies from
rogue employees who commit FCPA crimes despite company efforts to
prevent such crimes. Indeed, even the Export Enhancement Act of
270. This could be done by assigning the issue to a joint Congressional committee such as the Joint
Economic Committee, or to a research arm of Congress such as the Government Accountability Office.
271. See generally OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS., supra note 215.
272. For definitions of "knowing," "corruptly," and "intent," see supra notes 220-22.
273. See OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS., supra note 215, at 31 ("Creating a 'compliance defense' to
knowing and intentional violations of the Act would amount to eliminating criminal liability
under the Act all together by permitting a 'fig leaf' compliance program to insulate companies
from knowing and intentional wrong-doing.").
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1986, (discussed at pp. 40-41, supra), in defining "due diligence," stated
that a company would be protected from civil and criminally liability
only for FCPA violations made by employees who are not officers or
directors of the company.27 4 That legislation, although never signed into
law, intentionally and specifically disallowed protection of a company
from FCPA civil or criminal liability if the wrongdoers were either
officers or directors within the company. The drafters of that 1986
legislation were on the right track; any reasonable, modern-day
compliance defense law should follow suit and work to insulate
companies from FCPA civil and criminal liability only with respect to
lower level, rogue employees who are not officers or directors within
Not only would such legislation increase FCPA
the business.
compliance by providing the leadership of a business with strong
incentives to implement policies and programs to identify current (and
deter future) violations, but it would also provide corporations with
some protection against aggressive prosecutors who can otherwise
exploit the power imbalance inherent in the current FCPA statute.275
D.

JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF THE NPA AND
PROCESSES SHOULD BE MANDATED

DPA NEGOTIATION

This article suggests that the DOJ's Filip Memo failed in
achieving one of its primary goals: to rein in DOJ prosecutorial power
by increasing procedural protections for corporations under
investigation. As one commentator soberly puts it: "[T]here is a real
possibility that the new guidelines may create an underground system
of waiver and coercion because these tactics have become so
entrenched in white-collar practice."2 76 If that commentator is correct
and an "underground system of waiver and coercion" leads to
commonplace infringements on attorney-client or work product
protections, it would be a dire state of affairs indeed. These
protections, with their ethical and constitutional underpinnings, are
extremely important. The crux of the matter, of course, is that
companies who are being investigated by the DOJ, and who are in the
process of negotiating an NPA or DPA with the Department, do not
feel like they are in a position to say "no" when the DOJ makes
various suggestions during the course of the negotiation -even

274. See H.R. REP. No. 99-580, pt. 1, at 66 (1986).
275. See WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 202, at 13.
276. See Heyman, supra note 158, at 179.
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suggestions that might begin to infringe on attorney-client and/or
work product protections. If courts could be involved to referee or
play a "supervisory" role while the NPA or DPA is being negotiated,
that would provide for a more fair and balanced negotiation between
the DOJ and the accused party. Obviously, the details of such a
policy would need to be resolved (e.g., does the Judge need to be
present for all negotiation conversations, or can he or she simply be
on standby, making himself or herself available should a difficult
situation arise?). These details, however, could easily be fleshed out
over time; moreover, different jurisdictions and courts might
experiment with different ways of supervising such negotiations.
E.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NPAS AND DPAs AFTER THEY ARE
DRAFTED BUT BEFORE THEY ARE SIGNED SHOULD BE
MANDATED

Because prosecutors have the exclusive power to choose to indict
or to enter into an agreement such as an NPA or DPA, effective
judicial review does not require reviewing (or interfering with) a
charging decision, nor does it require dictating the terms of an NPA
or DPA. Rather, courts would play merely a reviewing or supervisory
role by approving or rejecting a completed agreement immediately
after it has been drafted, but before it has been signed by the parties
involved. With increased judicial review, not only would there be a
more reasonable balance of power between prosecutors and
corporations during the negotiation phase of NPA and DPA deal
making, but companies would be provided with guidance on how
some of the more vague FCPA provisions (such as where the law
stands regarding the definition of "foreign official") will be construed
by the courts. Judicial review would also make it less likely that the
DOJ's sometimes exuberant requests for cooperation do not
mistakenly result in over-disclosure by companies who feel they
simply cannot say "no" during the negotiation. Finally, judicial
review would ensure that DOJ claims and theories of corporate
wrongdoing actually stand on firm legal ground. Currently, most
agreements fail to explain: (1) whether (and how) the defendant's
conduct satisfies the elements of the FCPA violation and (2) whether
there is proper legal precedent to punish the defendant. Instead,
NPAs and DPAs currently tend to recite legal conclusions. If judicial
review were incorporated into the process as this article proposes,
then, after prosecutors and defendants finish negotiating the terms of
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an agreement, the court could review all the evidence, admitted facts,
and legal analyses to ensure the conclusions and terms of the
agreement are reasonable, legally supportable, and fair to both the
parties and the general public. Only after the court's review and
approval would the NPA or DPA become an enforceable agreement.
F.

JUDICIAL REVIEW REGARDING THE ISSUE OF
BREACHES SHOULD BE MANDATED

NPA AND DPA

Most DPAs and NPAs include a term giving the prosecutor the
right to determine whether a breach of the agreement has occurred.
If the corporation breaches, the agreement is thereby revoked and
the corporation becomes subject to prosecution. Moreover, there is
very little recourse for a corporation to contest the DOJ's
determination of breach, and it has no right to appeal the
determination to an independent, impartial judicial authority. This
threat of unilateral revocation of the agreement increases the
leverage exercised by prosecutors.
Surely, companies feel an
increased sense of pressure to cooperate with the DOJ throughout
the deferral period of the agreement, knowing that prosecutors have
the power to decide whether or not the terms of the agreement have
been met. In such a situation, prosecutors effectively become both
judge and jury over a corporation's criminal conduct. Judicial review
of the determination on whether or not a prosecution agreement has
been breached would clearly offer some measure of security to
companies that sign agreements.
While it is "axiomatic that the federal courts look with great
favor upon the voluntary resolution of litigation through
settlement," 277 a central criticism of the recommendations set forth
above might be: What gives courts the authority to perform the
judicial supervision and reviews that are recommended? To this I
would respond thusly:
First, U.S. District Court Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern
District of New York ruled, in United States v. HSBC Bank USA (see

fn. 250-59, supra), that courts have an important role to play in
reviewing and overseeing DPA agreements. While he stated that his
opinion did not apply to NPA agreements, this article attempts to
articulate why the ruling could and should extend to NPA agreements.
Moreover, in certain types of cases that present "special
277. Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1980).
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considerations not present in ordinary litigation," the law requires
that judges formally approve proposed settlements.279 Currently,
settlements requiring court approval include the following: (1)
bankruptcy claims; (2) class action and shareholder derivative suit
settlements; (3) environmental clean-up consent decrees under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"); (4) settlements of actions in which
receivers are appointed; (5) consent decrees in civil antitrust suits
brought by the United States; (6) settlements of employment claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); and (7) settlements in
cases involving incompetent persons or minors. 279
In all these categories of cases, courts are charged by statute (or rule)
to review proposed settlements to ensure that the settlement is "fair to the
persons whose interests the court is to protect." 28 0 Of course, a court's
power to approve or reject proposed settlements does not include the
power to force parties to accept a judicially amended agreement.21
It could be argued that FCPA cases also exhibit special
considerations not present in ordinary litigation, and that the law
should therefore require judges to review and approve FCPA
"settlements" achieved via NPA and DPA agreements.
The
justification for such court review would be largely analogous to that
which currently exists for:
(a) CERCLA environmental clean-up consent decrees, where
courts are currently required to ensure the settlement is "reasonable,
fair, and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to
serve;282
278. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1980), modified on
reh'g en banc, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman &
Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 835 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Our federal courts have neither the authority nor the
resources to review and approve the settlement of every case brought in the federal court
system. There are only certain designated types of suits .. . where settlement of the suit requires
court approval.").
279. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private
Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 123, 131-38 (2012).
280. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 (2004); see also United States v.
City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980), modified on reh'g en banc, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1981) ("In these ... situations, the standard for approval has been stated ... that the trial court must
find that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable....") (citations omitted).
281. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 (2004) ("The trial court
may not rewrite a settlement agreement; if it is unacceptable the court must disapprove it, but it
may suggest changes."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.05, cmt. d,
at 212 ("Numerous courts have recognized that a court may accept or reject a settlement but
may not impose terms on unwilling parties.").
282. United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R.
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(b) antitrust consent decrees in suits brought by the United
States, where courts are currently required to "ensure that the Justice
Department's use of consent decrees in antitrust cases would fully
promote the goals of the antitrust laws and foster public confidence in
their fair enforcement;" 283 and
(c) FLSA claim settlements, where courts are currently required
to ensure that the settlement is a "fair and reasonable resolution of a
bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions." 284
In all three situations, Congress has determined that a neutral
judge should review settlements to ensure they are consistent with the
applicable federal statute and the public interests and policies
expressed therein."5 Similarly, in Recommendation (E), supra, it is
proposed that courts be empowered to review FCPA diversion
agreements and ensure that "the conclusions and terms of the
agreement are reasonable, legally supportable, and fair to both the
parties and the general public."
VI. CONCLUSION
The six recommendations set forth above would help to level the
FCPA negotiation playing field between the DOJ and accused parties
as they work together toward a resolution. Even if one disagrees with
the recommendations or sees legislative, judicial, or political
roadblocks to their adoption or implementation, my hope is that the
article points out to readers that real and significant power
imbalances exist when the DOJ employs DPAs and NPAs to address
FCPA enforcement matters. This is not fair or just to the party sitting
on the "accused" side of the negotiation table, and something should
be done to address that unfairness.2 6

REP. No. 253, pt. 3, at 19 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042).
283. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131, 148 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
284. Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350,
1353 (11th Cir. 1982).
285. See Jeremy T. Grabill, JudicialReview of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL
L. REv. 123, 134-37 (2012).
286. As Federal Circuit Court Judge Harry T. Edwards warned nearly three decades ago:
Settling matters through ADR is not always "fair and just." Edwards, supra note 11, at 679
(emphasis original).

